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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the LLM in Transnational and European 
Commercial Law, Mediation, Arbitration and Energy Law at the International Hellenic 
University.  
This dissertation shall endeavor to present the Anti-Monopoly Law of China that came 
into force on August 1, 2008 and changed the landscape of competition law in a 
country where the concept of competition was unknown prior the 1990s. The AML 
consists of eight chapters: general provisions, monopoly agreements, abuse of 
dominant market position, concentration of undertakings, abuse of administrative 
power to eliminate or restrict competition, investigation into suspected monopolistic 
conduct, legal liabilities and supplementary articles.  
The purpose of this dissertation is to present the four basic pillars of Chinese 
competition law, i.e. monopolistic agreements, abuse of a dominant market position, 
mergers (concentrations under the AML) and abuse of administrative power, as well as 
the enforcement regime established under the AML. The historical and political 
context, prior and during the drafting of the law, is mentioned, as well as the 
controversies over certain provisions. The AML, while a competent competition law, 
has several weaknesses that are presented as part of this disseƌtatioŶ͛s analysis. 
Special notice should be given to the enforcement framework established under the 
AML and the unique decision of the State Council of China to authorize three differents 
enforcement agencies (MOFCOM, NRDC and SAIC). Ultimately, the influences from 
foreign legislation (European Union legislation, United States legislation) and 
international practices combined with the characteristics of Chinese society 
contributed in the creation of the AML. 
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Introduction 
Competition is the cornerstone of a fair market operation. The protection of 
competition is upheld by the antitrust legislation. A compact and comprehensive 
antitrust legislation can be the necessary tool for the prevention and elimination of 
monopolistic practices, the pƌoteĐtioŶ of faiƌ ŵaƌket ĐoŵpetitioŶ aŶd of ĐoŶsuŵeƌs͛ 
interests as well as the promotion of economic efficiency that is a factor of stability in a 
prosperous state.1 The Anti-Monopoly Law of China2 that came into force on August 1, 
2008 shared the above-mentioned goals and through its provisions strived to achieve 
them. 
For China, the enactment of antimonopoly legislation has been a long and 
tortuous journey and the Anti-Monopoly Law could be considered, despite its 
considerable flaws, an important milestone, since it includes -for the first time ever in 
the history of China- provisions that touch upon every important aspect of antitrust, 
even anticompetitive practices endorsed by administrative agencies, a subject not 
usually dealt with in antitrust laws.3 
The Anti-Monopoly Law of China (hereinafter AML) is the subject of this paper. 
There are eight chapters in this law: chapter 1 of general provisions, that includes 
articles detailing the purpose of the law, definitions of various terms, as well as articles 
that set general prohibitions and guidelines for the establishment of the appropriate 
authorities, chapter 2 of monopoly agreements, chapter 3 regarding the abuse of a 
dominant market position, chapter 4 dealing with the concentration of undertakings, 
chapter 5 that addresses the abuse of administrative power for the purpose of 
elimination or restriction of competition, chapter 6 regarding the investigation of 
suspected monopolistic conducts, chapter 7 that refers to legal liabilities and finally 
                                                 
1ZheŶguo Wu, ͚PeƌspeĐtiǀes oŶ the ChiŶese AŶti-Monopoly Laǁ͛ [ϮϬϬϴ] ϳϱ AŵeƌiĐaŶ Baƌ AssoĐiatioŶ 
Antitrust 73,76 
2Anti-MoŶopolǇ Laǁ of the People͛s RepuďliĐ of ChiŶa ;pƌoŵulgated ďǇ the StaŶdiŶg Coŵŵittee of the 
NatioŶal People͛s CoŶgƌess oŶ August 30, 2007 and effective August 1, 2008), available at 
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/Businessregulations/201303/20130300045909.shtm
l [accessed February 9, 2018] 
3Carl W. Hittinger and JohŶ D. Huh, ͚PƌaĐtitioŶeƌ Ŷote: The People͛s RepuďliĐ of ChiŶa eŶaĐts its fiƌst 
ĐoŵpƌeheŶsiǀe aŶtitƌust laǁ: TƌǇiŶg to pƌediĐt the uŶpƌediĐtaďle͛ [ϮϬϬϳ] ϰ Neǁ Yoƌk UŶiǀeƌsitǇ JouƌŶal 
of Laws & Business 245,246 
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chapter 8 that includes supplementary articles, stipulating mainly exemptions of this 
law regarding intellectual property and agricultural industry. 
The purpose of this paper is to present the historical and political conditions 
under which the AML formulated as well as the basic pillars of antitrust that are 
introduced through the various chapters in the law: monopoly (or monopolistic) 
agreements, abuse of dominant market position, concentration of undertakings and 
abuse of administrative power. Furthermore, this paper addresses the subject of 
enforcement under the AML. However, the exemptions set regarding intellectual 
property and agricultural industry shall not be discussed in this paper. The provisions 
of the law shall be presented, and it will be undoubtedly clear that each one of them is 
a component of a greater unit with the purpose to regulate practices and behaviors 
that could potentially harm competition. It should be stressed though that an analysis 
of each provision shall not take place since this paper aims to address the spirit of each 
chapter of the law stressing certain key points. 
The first part of this paper will address briefly the historical background of the 
AML, and the necessity for its enactment due to the inadequacy of existing legislation 
in establishing a comprehensive framework for the protection of competition. The 
second part will discuss the monopolistic agreements under the scope of the AML with 
references to prohibited practices as well as exceptions to said prohibitions. The third 
part will address the abuse of a dominant market position with references to practices 
that constitute abuse and the factors determining the dominance of an undertaking 
within a defined market. The fourth part will present the framework of concentration 
of undertakings and address the issue of the notification thresholds for impeding 
concentrations. The fifth part will focus on the administrative monopolies and their 
important role within the Chinese society due to its form as well as the struggle to 
contain their potential abuse. The sixth part will discuss the establishment of the three 
competent enforcement authorities, the investigation of suspected monopolistic 
practices, the penalties for an infringement of the law and lastly, the possibility of an 
administrative review and administrative litigation regarding the decision made by a 
competent authority. Finally, the last part of this paper will include certain conclusion 
remarks regarding the AML and its strengths and weaknesses. 
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The enactment of Anti-Monopoly Law 
 The drafting process of the AML began in 1994 and it was helmed by the State 
Economic and Trade Commission (SETC) -later to be succeeded in this particular 
assignment by the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM)- and the State Administration for 
Industry and Commerce (SAIC). After the circulation of a draft in 2002 with the 
intention to gather valuable commentary, numerous revisions took place followed by 
the submission of a draft to the NatioŶal People͛s CoŶgƌess Standing Committee for its 
first review in June 2006. The final draft of the AML was approved during its third 
review on August 30, 2007.4 
 The drafting and reviewing process of the AML lasted more than a decade, but 
what powered the decision to enact a comprehensive anti-monopoly law? In 1992, 
during the Fourteenth Meeting of the Chinese Communist Party, the objective of 
pursuing the establishment of a socialist market economy was unequivocally declared, 
thereby indicating the conversion of the State͛s economic model from central-planned 
economy to market economy.5 For this purpose, a number of laws as well as 
administrative regulations were adopted in the 1990s, as part of the bigger picture: a 
comprehensive antimonopoly legislation that protects competition and by extension 
ĐoŶsuŵeƌs͛ ƌights. 
 Among the laws that were adopted in the 1990s was the Anti-Unfair 
Competition Law6 which included several provisions aimed to eliminate monopolistic 
practices, such as tying7 and predatory pricing8. That law signified the first serious 
attempt of China in antitrust law, but its flaws far surpassed its strengths. The first 
important drawback of that laǁ ǁas that iŶ its esseŶĐe ǁas ͞ŵoƌe like a ĐoŶsuŵeƌ 
pƌoteĐtioŶ laǁ thaŶ aŶ aŶtitƌust laǁ͟, as Bruce M. Owen, Su Sun and Wentong Zheng 
aptlǇ poiŶted out iŶ theiƌ aƌtiĐle ͚ChiŶa͛s ĐoŵpetitioŶ poliĐǇ ƌefoƌŵs: The AŶti-
                                                 
4BƌuĐe M. OǁeŶ, Su SuŶ aŶd WeŶtoŶg ZheŶg, ͚ChiŶa͛s ĐoŵpetitioŶ poliĐǇ ƌefoƌŵs: The AŶti-Monopoly 
Laǁ aŶd ďeǇoŶd͛ [ϮϬϬϴ] ϳϱ AŵeƌiĐaŶ Baƌ AssoĐiatioŶ AŶtitƌust Ϯϯϭ,Ϯϯϲ 
5Supra note 1, p. 74 
6Anti-UŶfaiƌ CoŵpetitioŶ Laǁ of the People͛s RepuďliĐ of ChiŶa ;pƌoŵulgated ďǇ the StaŶdiŶg 
Committee of the National People͛s CoŶgƌess oŶ Septeŵďeƌ Ϯ, ϭϵϵϯ aŶd effeĐtiǀe DeĐeŵďeƌ ϭ, ϭϵϵϯͿ 
available at http://www.lawinfochina.com/Display.aspx?lib=law&Cgid=6359 [accessed February 9, 
2018] 
7See id, art. 12 
8See id, art. 11 
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MoŶopolǇ Laǁ aŶd ďeǇoŶd͛9 and they further stressed the fact that the Anti-Unfair 
Competition Law contains numerous provisions with little to no relevance to 
competition per se, such as provisions on bribery and deceptive advertising. Moreover, 
despite its best intentions, the Anti-Unfair Competition Law suffered from a lack of 
guidelines regarding the enforceability of its provisions and the competence of a 
specific authority to supervise the implementation of the law and enforce its 
provisions. 
 Various antitrust laws and regulations, such as the Anti-Unfair Competition 
Law, the Price Law, the Foreign Trade Law suffer from vagueness and repetitiveness in 
their provisions, whereas the AML succeeded in consolidating ͞the aŶtitƌust pƌoǀisioŶs 
iŶto a uŶifoƌŵ set of ƌules͟.10 Zhenguo Wu summarizes concisely the problems of the 
aŶtiŵoŶopolǇ legislatioŶ pƌioƌ to the eŶaĐtŵeŶt of the AML iŶ his aƌtiĐle ͚PeƌspeĐtiǀes 
on the Chinese Anti-MoŶopolǇ Laǁ͛.11 Specifically, he mentions the lack of a unified 
and complete anti-monopoly law, the impotency of the existing rules due to their 
impracticality and vagueness, which logically affects their impact and lastly, the 
insufficient penalties and liabilities that face those who violate the law. 
 Nevertheless, the AML is not without faults and its long drafting process 
revealed the political struggle behind its enactment. Chapter 5 of the AML that 
addresses the administrative monopolies was and still is the field where conflicting 
interests from different branches of government and private sector collide. Despite the 
lack of overall knowledge and experience on the field of competition, the much 
needed consultation that was provided by the international community (by individuals, 
both experts and practitioners, and organizations) and the high controversy of certain 
topics, the drafting process was successful in creating a law that would reflect the new 
system of socialist market economy, with characteristics applied directly to the 
Chinese economy and with the knowledge and experience from successful practices of 
foreign antimonopoly legislation. Lastly, this law enabled the accession of China in the 
World Trade Organization and facilitated the harmonization of the Chinese economy 
to the current economic trends internationally.12 
                                                 
9See supra note 4, p. 233 
10See supra note 4, p. 236 
11See supra note 1, p. 76 
12See supra note 1, pp. 78-79 
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Monopolistic Agreements 
 Chapter 2 of the AML (articles 13 to 16) is dedicated to monopolistic 
agreements. Under the scope of art. 3 of the AML,13 monopolistic agreements, abuse 
of a dominant market position as well as concentration of undertakings that do 
eliminate or restrict competition or could possibly lead to that effect shall be 
ĐoŶstƌued as ͞ŵoŶopolistiĐ ĐoŶduĐt͟. This part of the paper will explore the 
prohibition of monopolistic agreements and their potential absolution under the scope 
of the AML. 
 A conduct between two or more market operators that constitutes an 
agreement, either written or oral and leads unequivocally to the elimination or 
restriction of competition is strictly prohibited. That prohibition covers also 
agreements concluded between market operators with the purpose of elimination or 
restriction of competition, even if there is no actual restriction to competition yet. The 
protection of competition and by extension the protection of fair market operation are 
ĐƌitiĐal foƌ the staďilitǇ of a state͛s eĐoŶoŵǇ aŶd theƌefoƌe eǀeŶ the iŶteŶtioŶ to 
impede free competition is enough to guarantee the protection of the law. 
Art. 13 of the AML states that ”For the purposes of this law, monopoly 
agreements include agreements, decisions and other concerted conducts designed to 
eliŵiŶate or restriĐt ĐoŵpetitioŶ”. The pattern of the monopolistic agreements follows 
that of art. 101(1) TFEU that covers ͚all agreeŵeŶts ďetween undertakings, decisions by 
association of uŶdertakiŶgs aŶd ĐoŶĐerted praĐtiĐes͛.14 This similarity within the two 
texts is not the only one since the Chinese did draw from the European experience 
while drafting their Anti-Monopoly Law. Therefore, it is only logical to deduce that the 
agreements, decisions and concerted actions cited in art. 13 of the AML share the 
same characteristics with those cited in art. 101(1) TFEU. 
Under this scope, it is surmised that the decisions could include articles of 
incorporation, by-laws or even rules of a trade association in which the intention to 
behave in a manner irrespective of potential distortions in competition is clearly 
                                                 
13See Anti-Monopoly Law, supra note 2, art. 3 
14Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ C326/88, art. 
101 
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depicted. Regarding the concerted actions, it should be pointed out that a certain level 
of coordination is implied in order to achieve a distortion of competition. Therefore, 
market operators that jointly coordinate their actions even without an explicit 
agreement between them and their actions contribute to the elimination or restriction 
of competition, should be liable under art. 13 of the AML. 
 The AML makes a distinction between horizontal agreements and vertical 
agreements without explicitly mentioning those terms. Horizontal agreements are 
those that involve operators at the same level of production or sales process, e.g. 
producers, wholesalers, whereas vertical agreements are those that involve operators 
at a different level of production or sales process, e.g. a producer and a wholesaler or a 
wholesaler and a retailer.15 Accordingly, the AML dedicates art. 13 to the prohibition of 
horizontal agreements and art. 14 to the prohibition of vertical agreements. 
 Art. 13 of the AML explicitly prohibits five horizontal agreements that involve 
the fixing or alteration of pƌoduĐts͛ pƌiĐes, the restriction of the output or sales of 
products, the division of the sales market or of the raw material purchasing markets, 
the restriction of the purchase or development of new technology and/or new facilities 
and finally the joint boycott of transactions. Whichever agreements fall within the 
above-mentioned categories are considered illegal and incur the penalties of the law. 
Moreover, the law grants the antimonopoly authorities the competence to identify 
and accordingly prohibit other monopolistic agreements. 
 Art. 14 of the AML explicitly prohibits vertical agreements between an 
undertaking and a counterparty that involve the fixing of the resale price of products 
and the restriction of the minimum resale price. Correspondingly to art. 13 of AML, this 
provision provides also the antimonopoly authorities with the competence to identify 
other monopolistic agreements between operators at different stages in the 
production. 
 This broad discretion that is granted to the competent antimonopoly 
authorities regarding the identification of behaviors and practices that could fall under 
the prohibition of horizontal and vertical agreements has two sides. China due to its 
former economic system (central-planned economy), lacks the experience of 
identifying and handling anticompetitive practices in a uniform way. Therefore, it is 
                                                 
15Supra note 1, p. 81 
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conceivable that in its first comprehensive law regarding the protection of competition 
ǁould alloǁ foƌ ͞ďƌeathiŶg͟ ƌooŵ foƌ the ĐoŵpeteŶt aŶtiŵoŶopolǇ authoƌities. 
Moreover, the lack of practical experience of operating in the market under standard 
rules that are explicitly set as part of antimonopoly legislation combined with the lack 
of case law that could provide for the further identification of practices that restrict or 
eliminate competition were taken into account from the drafters of the law and as a 
ƌesult a ͚ĐatĐh-all͛ pƌoǀisioŶ16 was added to both articles 13 and 14. However, it has 
been observed in the international practice, that provisions which include broad or 
vague terms or their intention is somewhat unclear or they purposely do not define 
actions or even penalties, then those provisions create uncertainty in the market. A 
fair market operation is not abided by loosely defined terms and certainly not by the 
ambiguity of legality of certain actions according to an eventual decision by the 
competent antimonopoly authority. 
 Art. 15 of the AML lists the conditions under which a horizontal or vertical 
agreement could not be prohibited. This article lists seven, rather broad, exemptions in 
the general rule of prohibition of monopolistic agreements given that those 
agreements pursue very specific objectives. Monopolistic agreements with the 
purpose to improve technology as well as research and development of new products, 
agreements that aspire to the improvement of product quality, efficiency and unifying 
standards or reducing costs, agreements made specifically by enterprises that operate 
in a small or medium scale within the market and which desire to improve their 
operational efficiency and their competitiveness, agreements made under the threat 
of economic depression, in order to mitigate a serious decrease in sales volume or 
eǆĐessiǀe oǀeƌstoĐk aŶd fiŶallǇ agƌeeŵeŶts that seƌǀe ďesides the paƌties͛ iŶteƌests, 
also the public interests such as energy preservation or disaster relief, all fall under the 
scope of art. 15. In order for those specific agreements17 to qualify as an exception to 
the general prohibition of monopolistic agreements, it should be determined whether 
the consumers shall indeed share the benefits derived from said agreements and 
furthermore, it should be determined that the elimination of competition in the 
relevant market is not absolute. Those two important criteria are included in art. 15 for 
                                                 
16Supra note 3, p. 263 
17Listed from (i) to (v) in the text of art. 15 of the AML 
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the purpose of mitigating the effects of anticompetitive agreements and securing the 
resulting benefits for the public. Finally, the article includes in the exemptions the 
monopolistic agreements with the purpose of maintenance of legitimate interest in 
the cooperation with foreign economic entities and foreign trade and provides a catch-
all provision, according to which any other circumstances stipulated by laws and the 
State Council could justify an exemption of the general prohibition. 
 Arguably, these exemptions could provide safe haven for anticompetitive 
agreements that could have restrictive effects on competition on the market of foreign 
states. As the art. 2 of the AML calls attention to the extraterritorial application of the 
law mentioning that even conducts outside the territory of China with restrictive 
effects on competition on the domestic market fall within the scope of its application, 
similarly various foreign antitrust legislations contain provisions regarding the 
extraterritoriality of their laws. Essentially, an agreement that could fall under the 
exemptions of art. 15 of the AML, but effectively restricts competition in a foreign 
market, could very well be prohibited as anticompetitive in that territory and the 
operators Đould ďe puŶished uŶdeƌ this state͛s laǁs. 
 Moreover, it should be noted that the provision regarding the agreements 
made under the threat of economic depression has been highly criticized. Xiaoye Wang 
addƌesses this issue iŶ heƌ aƌtiĐle ͚Highlights of ChiŶa͛s Ŷeǁ AŶti-MoŶopolǇ Laǁ͛ 
statiŶg that ͞…a Đartel formed for the purpose of mitigating serious decreases in sales 
or excessive overstock during economic depressions should not be exempted because 
eĐoŶoŵiĐ doǁŶtuƌŶs aƌe paƌt of Ŷoƌŵal ĐoŵŵeƌĐial ƌisks…͟.18 In a free market where 
normal commercial risks are undertaken by the operators, such a provision could 
prove to be a threat to the fair market operation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18XiaoǇe WaŶg, ͚Highlights of ChiŶa͛s Ŷeǁ AŶti-MoŶopolǇ Laǁ͛ [ϮϬϬϴ] ϳϱ AŵeƌiĐaŶ Baƌ AssoĐiatioŶ 
Antitrust 133,137 
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Abuse of dominant market position 
 Chapter 3 of the AML (articles 17 to 19) is dedicated to the abuse of a dominant 
market position by an enterprise. Art. 6 of the AML states that ͟Undertakings holding a 
dominant position on the market may not abuse such position to eliminate or restrict 
competition͟. This paƌt of the paper shall examine the context of a dominant market 
position within a relevant market, the constructive and adverse characteristics of 
dominance within a market, the prerequisites of the law in determining a dominant 
market position and lastly, the actions declared prohibited under the scope of the AML 
when exercised by enterprises holding a dominant market position. 
 As already mentioned above, prior to the enactment of the AML, various laws 
and regulations composed the framework of competition law. The concept of a 
dominant market position was notoriously absent19 from the antimonopoly legislation 
up to 2003 and the Provisional Measures for the Prohibition against Monopolistic 
Pricing issued by the National Development and Reform Commission (hereinafter 
NRDC). These measures prohibit several actions provided that they are exercised by 
undertakings holding a dominant market position. The concept of a dominant market 
position was new and, according to these measures, dependent for its determination 
from the market share of the undertaking within the relevant market, the potential 
substitutability of the product as well as the difficulty experienced by the competitors 
to access the relevant market. 
 Three years later, in 2006, the Administrative Measures for Fair Transactions 
between Retailers and Suppliers are issued by the Ministry of Commerce (hereinafter 
MOFCOM), the NRDC, the Ministry of Public Security, the State Administration of 
Taxation and the State Administration of Industry and Commerce (hereinafter SAIC).20 
These ŵeasuƌes iŶtƌoduĐe the ĐoŶĐept of aŶ ͞adǀaŶtageous positioŶ͟ with a scope 
similar to the dominant market position under the AML.21 With that historical 
background and with the influence of European legislation as well as United States 
                                                 
19AdƌiaŶ EŵĐh, ͚Aďuse of doŵiŶaŶĐe iŶ ChiŶa: a paƌadigŵatiĐ shift?͟ [ϮϬϬϴ] EuƌopeaŶ CoŵpetitioŶ Laǁ 
Review 615,618 
20Administrative Measures for Fair Transactions between Retailers and Suppliers Order No. 17 [2006] 
(promulgated and effective November 15, 2006) available at 
http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=80561&lib=law [accessed February 10, 2018] 
21Supra note 19 
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legislation, the AML drafters adopted the concept of dominant market position and 
included provisions in the law regarding its abuse. 
 Not a few commentators remark the influence of the European competition 
law in structuring the definition of the dominant market position in art. 17. Xiaoye 
WaŶg ŵeŶtioŶs iŶ heƌ aƌtiĐle ͚Highlights of ChiŶa͛s Ŷeǁ AŶti-MoŶopolǇ laǁ͛ that ͞This 
defiŶitioŶ is siŵilaƌ to the ĐoŶĐept of a doŵiŶaŶt positioŶ iŶ EC ĐoŵpetitioŶ laǁ…͟,22 
an opinion suppoƌted also ďǇ AdƌiaŶ EŵĐh iŶ his aƌtiĐle ͚Aďuse of doŵiŶaŶĐe iŶ ChiŶa: 
a paƌadigŵatiĐ shift?͛ ǁho states that ͞To a certain extent, this definition is based on 
the ĐoŶĐept of a ͞doŵiŶaŶt positioŶ͟ iŶ EuƌopeaŶ UŶioŶ ĐoŵpetitioŶ laǁ͟.23 
According to art. 17 of the AML, an undertaking with a dominant market 
position shall possess certain powers over the relevant market, such as the ability to 
control the prices, quantities or even the trading conditions of the products or the 
ability to hinder or merely affect the accession of competing undertakings to the 
relevant market. Art. 12 of the AML supplements the definition of dominant market 
position with the definitions of undertaking and relevant market.24 The experiences 
from the European Union legislation prove that the context of the relevant market is 
crucial when dealing with competition issues. The definition in the AML contains a 
geographical aspect, in referring to a territorial area within which the market operators 
compete against each other as well as a reference to the relevant 
commodities/products and services.25 In the determination of the relevant market, the 
competent antimonopoly authorities are assisted by the SSNIP (the so-called small but 
significant and non-transitory increase in price) test that is utilized also in many 
jurisdictions. 
 But how exactly dominance affects market operation? Are there per-chance 
positive elements from the existence of dominance within a relevant market? It could 
be advocated that the occurrence of a dominant market position could prove to be 
somewhat essential in a market. A dominant enterprise, due to its scale, is based on 
efficiency, a sound utilization of limited resources and the promotion of lower costs 
                                                 
22Supra note 18, p. 138 
23Supra note 19, p. 616 
24See Anti-Monopoly Law, supra note 2, art. 12 
25Dan Wei, ͚AŶtitƌust iŶ ChiŶa: aŶ oǀeƌǀieǁ of ƌeĐeŶt iŵpleŵeŶtatioŶ of AŶti-MoŶopolǇ Laǁ͛ [ϮϬϭϯ] 
European Business Organization Law Review 119,125 
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throughout the production. Moreover, a dominant position in the market could allow 
for the enterprise to undertake more risks in technological innovations that could 
benefit the development of the industry.26 
 However, the adverse effects of a dominant position in the market cannot be 
understated. One can argue that a dominant enterprise operating without the 
pressure from competitors is not really motivated to control production costs or 
improve the resource utilization since its position in the market is granted. Moreover, 
an enterprise that could essentially control the market is prone to desire maximization 
of its profits through lower product quality combined with higher product prices. The 
motivation to innovate would be buried under the allure of high profits. With that 
objective, it is not difficult to perceive how a dominant enterprise would abuse its 
power resulting in elimination or restriction of competition. It is obvious from the 
arguments presented from each perspective, that the same aspects of the market that 
could be benefited from the existence of a dominant enterprise (costs, efficiency, 
technological innovations) could also be materially undermined.27 
 From the international practice has been observed a dichotomy regarding the 
dominant market position. In certain jurisdictions, such as in Japan, the obtainment of 
dominance from an enterprise activates the competent agency of the State in order to 
examine whether or not a dismissal (break-up) of the dominant enterprise should be 
carried out. In other jurisdictions, such as in Korea and in European Union, the 
obtainment of a dominant market position is not prohibited per se, whereas the abuse 
of such a position with adverse effects to the relevant market is indeed prohibited.28 
From the provisions of the AML, it is evident that China opted not to prohibit 
dominance, albeit its abuse within a relevant market. 
 Art. 6 of the law confirms the will of the AML drafters to not prohibit 
undertakings from holding a dominant market position. An enterprise could obtain a 
dominant market position through competition (such an occurrence was quite 
uncommon in China due to its former central-plaŶŶed eĐoŶoŵǇ aŶd the State͛s 
                                                 
26Supra note 1, p. 84 
27See id 
28Chen Lijie, ͚ChiŶese AŶti-Monopoly Law: The current state and problems of Anti-Monopoly legislation 
iŶ the People͛s RepuďliĐ of ChiŶa͛ [ϮϬϬϰ] ϯ WashiŶgtoŶ UŶiǀeƌsitǇ Gloďal Studies Laǁ Reǀieǁ ϯϬϳ,ϯϭϬ-
311 
  -12- 
unwillingness to relinquish power over large scale industries), through State 
authorization, where the State itself sanctions the control of certain products such as 
tobacco or salt from specific enterprises,29 and finally through the law itself, as 
required by the scale of economy since that kind of enterprises enjoy a privileged 
positioŶ ǁithiŶ the ŵaƌket as theǇ ͞aƌe eŶtƌusted ǁith the peƌfoƌŵaŶĐe of puďliĐ 
seƌǀiĐes͟.30 Regarding the second category, i.e. the State-sanctioned monopolies, it 
should be noted that the primary reason for the granting of dominance in the relevant 
market is a fiscal one, in order for the State to maintain its revenues from these 
products. Regarding the third category, i.e. the privileged enterprises by law, it should 
be pointed out that their existence occurs mainly in sectors such as the postal service, 
the transportation, the utilities (electricity, water etc.)31 and it is not an uncommon 
practice even in other countries, e.g. Greece. 
 In structuring art. 17, China opted to follow the EU practice of listing certain 
pƌohiďited aďusiǀe aĐtioŶs ;͞geŶeƌal plus listiŶg͟ ŵodeͿ aŶd ƌefƌaiŶed fƌoŵ pƌoǀidiŶg 
only a set of principles upon which the determination of abusive practices would be 
ďased ;͞geŶeƌal͟ ŵode), a practice adopted by the United States.32 Therefore, the AML 
drafters enumerate in art. 17 of the law a number of behaviors considered abusive if 
performed by a dominant enterprise which could potentially eliminate or restrict 
competition. The following conducts are prohibited when carried out by a dominant 
enterprise: selling products at unfairly high prices or buying them at unfairly low 
prices, selling products at prices below cost without legitimate reasons, refusing to 
trade with counterparties without legitimate reasons, compel a counterparty to trade 
exclusively with certain enterprises without legitimate reasons, tying products and 
applying dissimilar prices or other transaction conditions to equivalent 
counterparties.33 Finally, any other conducts identified by the competent authorities as 
abusive shall fall under the scope of application of art. 17 of the AML. The existence of 
the teƌŵ ͞justifiaďle ƌeasoŶs͟ iŶ ŶeaƌlǇ eǀeƌǇ Đlause of this aƌtiĐle Đƌeates a Đause of 
                                                 
29Supra note 1, p 84 
30Supra note 19, p. 620 
31Supra note 19, p. 620 
32Supra note 1, p. 85 
33See Anti-Monopoly Law, supra note 2, art. 17 
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concern due to the lack of definition of that particular term and the broad discretion of 
the competent authorities for once more. 
 The abusive practices listed above have themselves anticompetitive 
characteristics and when they are exercised by an enterprise with a dominant market 
position with the purpose to enhance its influence in the relevant market, then the 
competition suffers. Nevertheless, before the enactment of the prohibition regarding 
the above-listed abusive practices, it is crucial to determine whether an enterprise 
occupies indeed a dominant position within the relevant market. 
Art. 18 of the AML provides a non-exhaustive list of factors taken under 
consideration when determining the dominance of an enterprise. Specifically, art.18 
refers to the market share in the relevant market as well as the existing competition 
within, the ability to control sales or raw material purchasing markets, the financial 
status and technical conditions of the enterprise, the extent of dependence showed by 
other enterprises during transactions, the degree of difficulty experienced by 
enterprises aiming to enter the relevant market. The last clause of art. 18 is rather 
vague since it provides the competent authorities with broad discretion in determining 
any other potential factors that could mark an enterprise as dominant. 
 The market share is listed in art. 18 as one of the determining factors of 
dominance in a relevant market and an apt definition of it is proposed by Zhenguo Wu 
iŶ the aƌtiĐle ͚PeƌspeĐtiǀes oŶ the ChiŶese AŶti-MoŶopolǇ Laǁ͛ ǁheƌe he states that 
͞Maƌket shaƌe ƌefeƌs to the percentage of the total output, sales value, or production 
ĐapaĐitǇ of a speĐifiĐ eŶteƌpƌise iŶ the ƌeleǀaŶt ŵaƌket…͟.34 The importance of market 
share is further confirmed in art. 19 of the AML, where certain thresholds regarding 
the market share possessed by a dominant enterprise are presented. 
 The proposed thresholds regarding market share that enable the determination 
of dominance aƌe the folloǁiŶg: the ŵaƌket shaƌe of oŶe eŶteƌpƌise Đoǀeƌs ½ oƌ aďoǀe 
of the relevant market, the joint market share of two enterprises covers ⅔ or above of 
the ƌeleǀaŶt ŵaƌket aŶd lastlǇ, the joiŶt ŵaƌket shaƌe of thƌee eŶteƌpƌises Đoǀeƌs ¾ oƌ 
above of the relevant market. It is clarified in the same provision, that when an 
enterprise holds market share less than 10% of the relevant market in the last two 
                                                 
34Supra note 1, p. 86 
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categories mentioned above, then in that case, this specific enterprise shall not be 
considered to occupy a dominant market position.35 
 A most interesting element of art. 19 is the last clause of the provision where it 
is noted that the enterprises which can provide opposite evidence regarding their 
dominant market position, will indeed not be considered as dominant enterprises. 
Bearing that in mind, it is logical to conclude that art. 19 introduces a rebuttable 
presumption of dominance, a notion not unknown to other jurisdictions, such as 
Germany or Korea.36 Once more, it is obvious that China has contemplated the 
international practice and opted to adopt certified methods in determining 
dominance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
35See Anti-Monopoly Law, supra note 2, art. 19 
36Supra note 1, p. 86 
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Concentration of Undertakings 
 Chapter 4 of the AML (articles 20-31) regulates the concentration of 
undertakings. This part of the paper will address the notification obligation of 
impending concentrations, the notification thresholds, the two stages of the review 
process along with the strict requirements of such a notification, the conditional 
allowance of concentrations under specific restrictions and finally, the national 
security review aimed at impending concentrations helmed by foreign investors. 
 Regulation of concentrations exists in nearly every jurisdiction, as part of 
competition legislation. Concentrations have both a positive and negative scope: on 
the one hand, fewer enterprises that are healthy and economically sustainable can 
provide the market with quality products without engaging in commercial risks with 
potential destabilizing effects for the entire economy,37 while on the other hand, as 
already mentioned in the previous part of this paper, the existence of few -albeit 
economically sustainable- enterprises could lead to price increases, lower product 
quality and reluctance to engage in technological innovations.38 Since concentrations 
create this conflict, state regulation should be legislated and implemented. 
The AML addresses the regulation of concentrations according to international 
standards. The influence of European Union and United States experiences has been 
decisive, mostly regarding the review process of concentrations and its 
implementation through two stages. It should be noted that this chapter of the AML is 
much more elaborate than the previous chapters, indicating the will of the drafters to 
regulate sufficiently the field of concentration which is a complex and specialized one. 
Art. 20 of the AML includes three categories under the broad term 
͞ĐoŶĐeŶtƌatioŶ͟. Those Đategoƌies aƌe the folloǁiŶg: ŵeƌgeƌs of uŶdeƌtakiŶgs, 
acquisitions of undertakings by means of purchasing their shares or assets and 
                                                 
37As K.L. Aleǆ Lau, AŶgus YouŶg aŶd Y.N HoŶg also ŵeŶtioŶ: ͞A ŵeƌged eŶtitǇ is Đapaďle of pƌoduĐiŶg 
more products at lower cost than if the two entities were to operate sepaƌatelǇ.͟, see ͞Meƌgeƌ ĐoŶtƌol 
in China under the anti-ŵoŶopolǇ laǁ: a ĐoŵpetitioŶ ƌegiŵe iŶ tƌaŶsitioŶ͟ [ϮϬϭϲ] CoŵpaŶǇ LaǁǇeƌ Ϯϴϱ 
38Supra note 28, p. 312 
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acquisitions of undertakings by contract or any other means or acquisition of the 
ability to exercise decisive influence over said undertakings.39 
 Article 21 of the AML indicates that the minimum notification criteria shall be 
stipulated by the State Council. In a previous draft of the law, specific notification 
criteria were included. However, their lack of consideration regarding the effects of an 
impending concentration on the Chinese domestic market resulted in their disapproval 
during the last review, prior to the promulgation of the law.40 This decision was 
reinforced by the following argument as presented by Zhenguo Wu in his article 
͚PeƌspeĐtiǀes oŶ the ChiŶese AŶti-MoŶopolǇ Laǁ͛, regarding the appropriate 
ŶotifiĐatioŶ thƌesholds, ͞…if the staŶdaƌds ǁeƌe set too loǁ, theŶ ŶotifiĐatioŶs ǁould 
ďe ƌeƋuiƌed too fƌeƋueŶtlǇ…[I]f the staŶdaƌds ǁeƌe set too high, it would be 
disadvantageous for the prevention of monopoly caused by over-ĐoŶĐeŶtƌatioŶ͟.41 
Among the commentators were those who proposed different notification thresholds 
for different industries, while others believed that the market share presents an 
important factor that should be considered when determining the notification 
thresholds.42 The current form of art. 21 proves the lack of consensus regarding the 
notification thresholds and the adoption of the notion that the State Council should be 
authorized to stipulate the notification thresholds.43 Another important element of the 
provision is that the notification of a concentration to the competent authorities is 
compulsory and it should be filed prior to said concentration. 
 Concentrations that do not meet the notification thresholds stipulated by the 
State Council can be implemented without a notification to the competent 
antimonopoly authorities. Furthermore, the law in art. 22 provides two exemptions to 
the general rule of filing a concentration notification prior to its implementation.44 
                                                 
39The terms concentration and acquisition of control were not defined in the law, possibly with the 
intention to grant the competent enforcement authority discretionary powers, supra note 37, p. 288 
40Supra note 18, p. 139 
41Supra note 1, p. 89 
42See id 
43The Regulation on Notification Thresholds for Concentration of Undertakings by the State Council that 
was promulgated on August 3, 2008 included the long-awaited notification thresholds that were based 
upon the turnover of the undertakings in the international market as well as in the Chinese domestic 
market, see Peter Wang, H. Stephen Harris,Jr. and Yizhe ZhaŶg, ͚New Merger Notification Thresholds 
uŶdeƌ the AML puďlished͛ ;Ϯϵ August, ϮϬϬϴͿ 
http://www.mondaq.com/china/x/64738/Antitrust+Competition/New+Merger+Notification+Thresholds
+Under+The+AML+Published [accessed February 14, 2018] 
44See Anti-Monopoly Law, supra note 2, art. 22 
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 A concentration notification should include per art. 23 of the AML a summary 
of the notification, a report on the effect of the concentration on competition on the 
relevant market, the concentration agreement of the enterprises involved, financial 
and accounting reports of the enterprises involved dated to the previous accounting 
year and any other documents required by the competent antimonopoly authorities. It 
is interesting that among the prerequisites of a notification file is a report regarding 
the effects on competition on the relevant market. As Dan Wei states in the article 
͚AŶtitƌust iŶ ChiŶa: aŶ oǀeƌǀieǁ of recent implementation of Anti-MoŶopolǇ Laǁ͛, ͞It 
can be very difficult for a single business operator to gather data about the relevant 
ŵaƌket aŶd the iŵpaĐts oŶ the ŵaƌket ĐoŵpetitioŶ stƌuĐtuƌe…͟.45 Art. 24 of the AML 
further states that an incomplete file due to the absence of certain documents or 
materials shall result in considering the notification not filed. The article further 
stipulates that a period of time will be granted to the applicants in order to submit the 
documents not included in the initial file. 
 Unlike the previous chapters, the chapter on concentration of undertakings 
sets strict time limits during which the competent antimonopoly authorities should 
review and decide upon the implementation of a concentration.46 With the expiration 
of the allotted period of time, the concentration can be implemented whether there is 
a decision allowing it or not. According to articles 25 and 26 of the AML, the review 
process of a concentration notification is divided into two stages: a preliminary review 
stage and a further review stage. 
Art. 25 of the law describes the preliminary review stage that lasts thirty 
calendar47 days and during that time the competent antimonopoly authorities should 
decide whether to initiate a further review. It is also stipulated that the thirty days are 
calculated from the date of receipt of the complete notification file. The potential 
outcomes of this first stage are two: either the concentration is deemed to have little 
to no effect on competition on the relevant market and therefore no further review is 
needed, or the concentration is estimated to potentially affect competition on the 
                                                 
45Supra note 25, p. 124 
46Supra note 3, p. 265 
47Supra note 1, p. 90 
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relevant market and therefore the review process shall continue and conclude with the 
second stage, during which a further review of the concentration shall take place. 
In the event of a concentration that does not affect competition, the 
authorities will notify the applicants, in order to proceed with the concentration. The 
last clause of art. 25 provides that when no decision has been made within the allotted 
time limit, then the concentration may be implemented. In the event of a 
concentration that is deemed to restrict competition, the authorities will notify the 
applicants in writing. 
 Art. 26 of the AML describes the second stage of the review process, i.e. the 
further review stage that lasts ninety days calculated from the date of the initial 
decision being taken. Within these ninety days, the competent antimonopoly 
authorities shall first, review the concentration and decide whether or not to prohibit 
it and second, inform in writing the applicants of said decision. In the event of a 
negative decision regarding the concentration, the reasons shall be explained. At this 
second stage, a concentration can be implemented if a positive decision has been 
issued by the authorities or if the authorities have not decided whether the 
concentration indeed threatens the competition on the relevant market upon the 
expiration of the allotted time limit. The last element of this provision is the extension 
of the initial deadline (by sixty days) that can be granted under the circumstances 
stipulated in the article. Specifically, if the involved undertakings agree to the 
extension of the time limit or if the documents submitted with the notification are 
inaccurate and in need of verification, or in the event of significant changes of the 
relevant circumstances after the filing of the notification, thereupon the extension of 
the time limit is granted. 
 The competent antimonopoly authorities during the review of a concentration 
shall take under consideration a list of factors presented in art. 27 of the AML. Those 
factors are based on common international practice48 and can assist the authorities in 
their decision regarding an impending concentration. The market share of the 
undertakings in the relevant market and their controlling power over the market 
should the concentration be allowed, the degree of concentration within the relevant 
market, the impact regarding the access to the market and to technology 
                                                 
48Supra note 1, p. 93 
  -19- 
developments, the impact to consumers and other market operators, the impact over 
national economic development and any other factors deemed by the authorities to 
affect competition, can provide a guideline to the competent antimonopoly authorities 
deciding upon the concentration. Those factors are freely evaluated and according to 
XiaoǇe WaŶg iŶ heƌ aƌtiĐle ͚Highlights of ChiŶa͛s Ŷeǁ AŶti-MoŶopolǇ Laǁ͛, ͞…it is Ŷot 
clear how the Anti-MoŶopolǇ AuthoƌitǇ ǁill ǁeigh theiƌ ƌelatiǀe iŵpoƌtaŶĐe.͟49 
 The first clause of art. 28 of the AML sets the general prohibition of 
concentrations that have or may have adverse effects on competition in the relevant 
market. However, in the second clause of the provision two exemptions of the general 
rule are cited: a concentration with adverse effects on competition could be allowed if 
the involved undertakings could prove that the implementation of the concentration 
will have a positive effect on competition that outweighs its potential negative impact 
or if the involved undertakings could prove that the concentration is in harmony with 
public interests. From the phrasing of these two exemptions, it can be deduced that it 
is upon the discretion of the competent antimonopoly authorities to accept any 
evidence provided by the involved undertakings and decide not to prohibit a 
concentration. It must be stressed that even if a concentration is allowed to be 
implemented, the negative impact on competition would still ensue which presents a 
conundrum: how could such a concentration be in harmony with public interests and 
hoǁ ͞puďliĐ iŶteƌests͟ aƌe ƌeallǇ defiŶed? 
 Art. 29 of the AML addresses the discretion of the competent antimonopoly 
authorities to impose restrictions and further conditions upon a concentration in order 
for it to meet with approval. The restrictions and further conditions50 should aim to 
mitigate the negative effect of the concentration on competition. This article follows a 
common practice adopted by the competent authorities in different jurisdictions: 
certain restrictive conditions with close connection to competition factors are placed 
upon the impending concentration in order to diminish the potential negative impact 
                                                 
49Supra note 18, p. 140 
50Restrictive conditions on a transaction can be categorized into three types: structural remedies, 
behavioural remedies and combinations of structural and behavioural remedies, see H. Stephen Harris, 
Peter J. Wang and Yizhe Zhang, ͚China's antitrust agency provides insights into the merger review 
process under the new Anti-Monopoly Law͛ [ϮϬϬϵ] IŶteƌŶatioŶal CoŵpaŶǇ aŶd CoŵŵeƌĐial Laǁ Reǀieǁ 
172, 174 
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on competition.51 The close connection of the restrictive conditions to competition 
factors aims ͞To pƌoteĐt the legitiŵate iŶteƌests of the opeƌatoƌs aŶd pƌeǀeŶt the aŶti-
monopoly law enforcement authorities froŵ aďusiŶg theiƌ poǁeƌ…͟,52 as Zhenguo Wu 
eǆplaiŶs iŶ the aƌtiĐle ͚PeƌspeĐtiǀes oŶ the ChiŶese AŶti-MoŶopolǇ Laǁ͛. 
 Art. 31 of the AML addresses the potential of a national security review when 
foreign investors participate in a concentration of an enterprise that involves national 
security. For the purpose of national security, these concentrations shall be submitted 
into a national security review besides the required review process of articles 25 and 
26 of the law. Within the context of the provision, it is not clear which agency shall 
conduct the national security review,53 which, unfortunately, is not the only concern 
regarding this provision. The last article of chapter 4 of the AML is a rather 
controversial one that concerns the international community since it adds an 
unpredictable element in commercial agreements. 
 While the AML offers a much-needed regulation of the concentrations 
landscape, it also makes a distinction, in art. 31, between domestic market operators 
and foreign market operators that could potentially increase the difficulty of 
penetration into the market for the latter. This distinction can be observed only in that 
article and, thusly, it can be surmised that the rest provisions of chapter 4 of the AML 
apply equally to domestic and foreign investors. 
 Neither in the general provisions of the law nor in the text of art. 31 is clarified 
what constitutes national security. The ambiguity of the term causes uncertainty, 
justifiably so, to foreign investors. It is more likely that China wished to limit foreign 
investment in certain sensitive sectors and opted to include this provision in the law 
despite the adverse comments on the topic by the international community. It is 
extremely interesting that despite the many dissenting opinions of the AML drafters 
over various of the provisions of the law, at the subject of limiting the entry of foreign 
investors in certain key sectors of the economy, there was a near consensus.54Despite 
the controversy of the topic, this kind of restriction on foreign investments in a 
domestic market is not unheard of. For instance, the United States do limit the foreign 
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ownership in certain sectors, such as broadcast stations, airlines and merchant 
vessels.55 
 AŶotheƌ issue ƌegaƌdiŶg this pƌoǀisioŶ is that ͞…the pƌoǀisioŶ related to 
ŶatioŶal seĐuƌitǇ ƌeǀieǁ ŵaǇ ďe totallǇ uŶŶeĐessaƌǇ foƌ ĐoŵpetitioŶ laǁ puƌposes…͟, 
aĐĐoƌdiŶg to XiaoǇe WaŶg iŶ the aƌtiĐle ͚Highlights of ChiŶa͛s Ŷeǁ AŶti-Monopoly 
Laǁ͛.56 There is no organic connection between a national security review and the 
market structure or the anticompetitive practices exercised within it (the market), 
which are the main focus of the AML. Ultimately, the harm to the ĐoŶsuŵeƌs͛ interests 
by anticompetitive practices condoned by either domestic or foreign enterprises is not 
dissimilar.57 
 Consequently, it should be pointed out that chapter 4 of the AML handles 
adequately the subject of concentration of undertakings, setting tight time 
requirements, emphasizing the need of notification prior to the implementation of a 
concentration, specifying the necessary documents that should be submitted alongside 
the notification and providing for the event of a concentration with adverse effects on 
competition, that nonetheless could be implemented. This chapter includes also catch-
all provisions that attempt to cover any case scenario by granting the competent 
antimonopoly authorities the power to decide whether or not a specific case falls 
under the scope of application of a certain provision, but also elects to grant the State 
Council the authority of determining the notification thresholds. Ultimately, unlike the 
practice in European Union and in United States, the review of an impending 
concentration does take into account other factors,58 as stipulated in the specific 
provision, besides the effect on competition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
55See id 
56Supra note 18, p. 141 
57It is argued by Li Junfeng that pressure has been created upon the Chinese authorities to enact AML in 
order to safeguard domestic enterprises against foreign invested enterprises that enjoy a robust 
eĐoŶoŵiĐ deǀelopŵeŶt, see ͚FoƌeigŶ iŶǀested ĐoŵpaŶies: ŵoƌe ƌiskǇ faĐiŶg up to ĐhiŶa͛s aŶti-monopoly 
laǁ͛ [ϮϬϬϵ] IŶteƌŶatioŶal JouƌŶal of Laǁ & MaŶageŵeŶt ϭϳϵ, ϭϴϮ 
58Supra note 25, p.125 
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Abuse of administrative power 
 Chapter 5 of the AML (articles 32 to 37) addresses the issue of abuse of 
administrative power with the purpose to eliminate or restrict competition. This part 
of the paper will focus not only on the so-called administrative monopoly, but also to 
the state-owned enterprises and their behavior, since in reality those two topics are 
intertwined. Moreover, the historical background of the administrative monopoly, its 
manifestation in the market and its effect on competition will be examined. 
Administrative monopoly 
 ͞Administrative departments or organizations authorized by laws or regulations 
to perform the function of administrating public affairs may not abuse their 
administrative power to eliminate or restriĐt ĐoŵpetitioŶ”, according to art. 6 of 
chapter 1 of the AML. Chapter 5 of the law elucidates on this matter and sets forth 
detailed prohibitions regarding the abuse of administrative power. Before presenting 
the articles included in this chapter of the law, it is important to comprehend the 
historical background of administrative monopoly as well as the controversy presented 
by its regulation from the AML. 
 Since no definition of administrative monopoly is presented by the AML, it 
would be logical to deduce that this kind of monopoly manifests when the state or its 
agencies that control a certain sector of the economy, abuse their power with the 
purpose to restrict or eliminate competition. The existence of such a monopoly is not 
limited to China, but it can be also observed in Russia and other Eastern European 
countries, like Hungary and Bulgaria,59 that have similar experiences in dealing with 
administrative monopoly. Essentially, administrative monopoly separates the market 
into two sub-sections: the first one where market entry is open, and competition 
thrives and the second one where market entry is restricted, and competition is weak 
due to the predominance of administrative monopoly aptly depicted in the treatment 
of state-owned enterprises.60 
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The regulation of administrative monopoly has been attempted prior to the 
enactment of AML by virtue of different provisions on various laws and regulations. 
Art. 30 of the Anti-Unfair Competition Law prohibits the use of administrative power to 
impose restrictions on competition,61 whereas the Rules on Prohibiting Regional 
Blockades in Market Economic Activities62 prohibit, specifically, regional blockades that 
ŵaŶifest as ͞loĐal pƌoteĐtioŶisŵ͟ ďǇ loĐal aŶd pƌoǀiŶĐial authoƌities ǁith the puƌpose 
to prevent commodities and services from other areas of the state to enter in the local 
market.63 It is obvious that the effective regulation of administrative monopoly could 
not be achieved through provisions fragmented over various laws and rules. 
 However, during the drafting and review process of the AML, a disagreement 
arose of whether this new law on the protection of competition should include 
provisions regulating administrative monopoly. The main opinions were two: some 
believed that since the AML aims to regulate private commercial monopolistic 
conduct, the existence of provisions regarding the abuse of administrative power is 
pointless since an administrative monopoly manifests, essentially, as the misuse of 
administrative powers and has little to do with private commercial monopolistic 
conducts, while others supported the reasoning that since an administrative monopoly 
impedes competition and disrupts the fair operation of the market as well as 
undermines the legitimate interests of both consumers and market operators, it 
should be regulated by the law with the mandate to protect competition.64 
 The indecision regarding this matter is depicted in the actions of the State 
Council which officially approved a draft of the law in June 2006 that did not include a 
chapter regulating the administrative monopoly, but later on when that draft was 
submitted by the State Council itself to the Standing Committee for its first reading, 
the deleted chapter on administrative monopoly had been reinstated.65 Ultimately, 
͞…eǀen though in theory administrative monopoly is not a problem to be solved by the 
AML and in practice it will indeed be very hard for the AML to solve this problem, it is 
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nonetheless necessary to have clear and specific regulations on administrative 
monopoly in the AML, which is a specific and fundamental law to protect 
ĐoŵpetitioŶ͟,66 as Zhenguo Wu poiŶts out iŶ the aƌtiĐle ͚PeƌspeĐtiǀes oŶ the ChiŶese 
Anti-MoŶopolǇ Laǁ͛. 
 As already mentioned above, administrative monopoly has its roots in the 
central-planned economy system under which state-owned enterprises dominated 
nearly every sector of the economy and not only the traditional state-protected 
sectors such as utilities and transportation. In China, state-owned enterprises operated 
even in sectors such as entertainment and tourism.67 In reality, administrative 
monopolies manifested through various practices68 engaged by either the local or 
central government, such as the setting of industrial trade barriers or the setting of 
regional blockades. 
 According to BƌuĐe M. OǁeŶ, Su SuŶ aŶd WeŶtoŶg ZheŶg iŶ the aƌtiĐle ͚ChiŶa͛s 
competition policy reforms: the Anti-MoŶopolǇ Laǁ aŶd ďeǇoŶd͛, administrative 
monopolies could be classified into three categories: those that result from 
governmental (either in local/provincial level or in central level) measures with the 
purpose to restrict competition in a particular industry or to compel a specific 
anticompetitive conduct, those that result from governmental measures which oblige 
the use of products or services by market operators strictly defined by the competent 
government agencies and lastly, those that result from governmental actions with the 
purpose to restrict market entry.69 A quite famous example of the first category is the 
ban on air ticket discounts set by the Bureau of Civil Aviation, that was, however, 
disregarded by the airlines and ultimately lifted.70 An example of the second category 
is the obligation set by certain local civil affairs agencies that permitted the consumers 
to visit only designated photo studios for pictures intended for marriage licenses.71 
Finally, regarding the last category, it should be mentioned that it encompasses 
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restrictions to enter a certain economic sector, but also restrictions to enter an 
adequately defined geographic market (local protectionism). An example of local 
protectionism is the decision to charge higher fees for cars produced outside of 
Shanghai.72 
 In tackling these issues, the AML stipulated specific prohibitions in the articles 
32 to 37. Art. 32 of the law sets a prohibition for all administrative agencies and 
organizations which administer public affairs to obligate consumers or market 
operators in purchasing or using commodities of designated undertakings. 
Art 33 of the law prohibits all administrative agencies and organizations which 
administer public affairs to impede regional commodity circulation and lists certain 
ĐoŶduĐts that fall uŶdeƌ this pƌoǀisioŶ͛s sĐope of appliĐatioŶ: disĐƌiŵiŶatoƌǇ Đhaƌge 
rates or prices for non-local commodities, imposition of technical specifications on 
non-local commodities that differentiate from those imposed on similar local 
commodities or implementing discriminatory technical measures (for instance, 
repeated certification) against non-local commodities, targeting of non-local 
commodities through the implementation of special practices of administrative 
licensing with the purpose of restricting access to the market, creation of barriers or 
adopting any other means in order to block non-local commodities from entering the 
market or local commodities from exiting the local market. The last clause of art. 33 
stipulates that any other conducts that impede the free regional commodity circulation 
are prohibited. 
This clause of art. 33 follows the pattern of many other provisions of the law 
that are characterized as catch-all provisions and intend to provide for any other 
conduct or practice that the drafters have not foreseen or has not yet appeared or 
identified in the market. However, the important factor, in this case, is that the law 
does not stipulate who will decide which conducts are deemed to impede the free 
regional commodity circulation. The catch-all provisions of this law, usually, allow the 
competent antimonopoly authorities to decide which other conducts or practices not 
specified in this law could fall under the scope of application of a certain provision. 
Perhaps, this is the will of the drafters in that provision as well. 
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 Art 34 of the law prohibits all administrative agencies and organizations which 
administer public affairs from restricting the entrance of non-local undertakings in 
local bid activities or excluding them from those activities altogether by the 
implementation of discriminatory qualification requirements. 
 Art 35 of the law prohibits all administrative agencies and organizations which 
administer public affairs from restricting or rejecting the establishment of local 
branches initiated by non-local undertakings or the implementation of investments in 
the local area. Such actions from the administrative agencies and organizations shall 
fall under the scope of application of this provision provided that they differentiate 
between non-local and local undertakings, with non-local undertakings bearing the 
unfair treatment. 
 Art 36 of the law prohibits all administrative agencies and organizations which 
administer public affairs from forcing other undertakings to engage in monopolistic 
conducts. Monopolistic conduct as defined by art. 3 of the AML includes monopolistic 
agreements, abuse of a dominant market position and concentration of undertakings. 
The AML drafters recognized that an administrative agency with considerable power 
could force other undertakings to engage in monopolistic practices prohibited by this 
law, perhaps even more easily due to its position, and therefore included such a 
prohibition in the law. 
 Finally, art. 37 of the law stipulates that administrative agencies with the power 
to formulate regulations shall not include terms within said regulations that promote 
or restrict competition. The AML drafters acknowledged the fact that certain 
administrative agencies within the government structure are granted with the power 
to control certain sectors of the economy and, furthermore, issue regulations that 
should be adhered to by the undertakings operating within the market, and opted to 
prohibit the abuse of administrative power through a catch-all provision.73 
 One of the most critical issues that the Chinese economy faces is the 
elimination of local protectionism that has a long and tortuous history. Despite the 
existence of provisions in various laws and regulations prohibiting acts of local 
protectionism, the issue persisted not only in the level of regulation and supervision, 
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ďut also iŶ the leǀel of eŶfoƌĐeŵeŶt ;͞ĐeŶtƌal ǀeƌsus loĐal goǀeƌŶŵeŶts͟ pƌoďleŵͿ.74 
The AML through its provisions in chapter 5 attempts to put a stop to actions of local 
governments which by abusing their administrative power aim to protect local 
commodities and services against non-local ones, distorting thusly the competition. 
 Consequently, it is undeniable that the administrative monopoly and its 
regulation are highly important as well as controversial. The administrative system that 
has been created decades ago is in need of reforms, both of political and economic 
nature. The prohibitions of chapter 5 are an important step towards the right 
direction, since the illegality of certain actions is highlighted, and it rests with the 
competent enforcement authorities to act accordingly to the mandate of the law. 
State-owned enterprises 
 During the former economic system of China, every major industry in the 
market was controlled and essentially operated by a corresponding ministry. After the 
transition to a market economy based on competition between market operators, the 
Chinese government chose to retreat from industries such as machinery and textiles 
and retain its control in industries with close connection to national security and 
overall economic development, such as utilities (electricity, water supply etc.) and 
transportation (railways, aviation etc.).75 
 Those industries to which the Chinese government retains control involve 
natural monopolies. In that sector of the market, where state-owned enterprises 
operate, there is a lack of competition due to natural conditions as well as technology 
restraints.76 Natural monopolies encapsulate an inherent monopoly and subsequently, 
are manifested as restrictions on competition. Moreover, these state-owned 
enterprises are the subject of preferential treatment that quite usually is interpreted 
as access to resources, such as capital and land bestowals.77 
 It has been observed that the lack of competition in these industries results in 
lack of motivation for achieving operation efficiency and improving product or service 
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quality. Moreover, the lack of competition is translated to a dominant market position 
and by extension, to adoption of abusive behaviors. Specifically, state-owned 
enterprises quite often engage in the following practices: excessive pricing (when the 
price of the product or service offered is set above the competition level),78 
compulsory charges (refers to the unreasonable fees imposed upon the consumer 
along with the use of the service or the product) that have either obtained 
governmental approval or are imposed by the discretion of the enterprise and they are 
often not disclosed to the final consumers,79 cross-subsidizing (when the reduced 
profits from the offer of services at a lower margin in remote locations is financed by 
the higher prices imposed elsewhere),80 boycotting (refers to the refusal to deal with 
current or potential competitors),81 restrictions on access to infrastructure (refers to 
the cases where the state-owned enterprise controls the access to infrastructure),82 
tying of products (refers to the cases when the consumer is obligated, in order to 
utilize a service or buy a product, to further engage in another unreasonable 
transaction).83 
 The State does Ŷot ǁish to ƌeliŶƋuish its ĐoŶtƌol iŶ ĐeƌtaiŶ ͞stƌategiĐ͟ 
industries, such as national defense, electrical power generation and grids, 
telecommunications.84 On the other hand, it has been stressed that the monopolistic 
power of the state-owned enterprises should be detained, an argument supported by 
the dissatisfaction of the general public over the poor service quality combined with 
the high prices85 of products and services offered by state-owned enterprises. For 
these reasons, the State opted to introduce competition into certain sectors, such as 
the telecommunication industry, by breaking the original state-owned enterprise into 
multiple entities that shall compete with one another. The enactment of legislation 
regarding the state-owned enterprises and their conduct within the market would be 
another way to control their monopolistic power. 
                                                 
78Supra note 76, p. 156 
79Supra note 76, p. 160 
80Supra note 76, p. 164 
81See id 
82Supra note 76, p. 165 
83See id 
84Supra note 4, p. 244 
85Supra note 1, p. 99 
  -29- 
 Under art. 7 of the AML state-owned enterprises that operate in certain 
industries crucial for the national economy and the national security shall act in 
accordance with the law. The lawful exclusive operation of these enterprises is 
protected by the State that has also the authority to regulate and control the prices of 
commodities and services within these industries. The last clause of this article 
indicates certain requirements regarding the behavior of the state-owned enterprises 
that include the lawful and in good faith conduct of business operations, the strict self-
regulation as well as the acceptance of public supervision and finally, the abstaining of 
aďusiǀe pƌaĐtiĐes that Đould poteŶtiallǇ ƌestƌiĐt ĐoŵpetitioŶ aŶd haƌŵ ĐoŶsuŵeƌs͛ 
interests. This provision was absent from the draft that the State Council submitted to 
the Standing Committee for review and was later added by the Standing Committee 
itself, a fact that underlines its importance. 
 AĐĐoƌdiŶg to JaĐoď S. SĐhŶeideƌ iŶ the aƌtiĐle ͚Note: AdŵiŶistƌatiǀe ŵoŶopolǇ 
and China͛s Ŷeǁ AŶti-MoŶopolǇ Laǁ: LessoŶs fƌoŵ Euƌope͛s State Aid doĐtƌiŶe͛, ͞A 
major flaw in the AML is the lack of clear distinction between SOEs that are essentially 
commercial and should be subject to the AML and other administrative organs which 
serve traditioŶal puďliĐ fuŶĐtioŶs aŶd should ďe eǆeŵpt fƌoŵ it͟.86 Commercial state-
owned enterprises, as already mentioned above, do not perform public service, albeit 
they operate under state regulations in order to guarantee the revenues from certain 
activities,87 whereas the state-owned enterprises serving public functions include 
those that facilitate production and everyday life.88 There is a lack of direction, 
regarding those two categories that is depicted in art. 7 which does not differentiate 
among them. However, art. 7 does impose a general obligation for state-owned 
enterprises to operate accordingly to the AML, determining thusly that their actions 
will be examined under the scope of application of the law that prohibits any conduct 
with the potential to eliminate or restrict competition. 
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Enforcement under the scope of AML 
 This part of the paper will examine the enforcement regime of the AML, the 
competent enforcement agencies, and their allocated tasks, the investigation of 
suspected monopolistic conducts, the imposition of penalties, the leniency program 
adopted under the AML and finally, the administrative review and litigation against 
decisions issued by the competent enforcement agency. 
Competent enforcement agencies 
 In order to comprehend the mandate under which the enforcement agencies 
exercise their power under the AML, it will be prudent to examine the goals of the law 
that create the nexus within which all decisions shall be taken. According to art. 1 of 
the AML, the law aims to prevent and restrain monopolistic conducts, safeguard fair 
ŵaƌket opeƌatioŶ, ĐoŶsuŵeƌs͛ iŶteƌests aŶd puďliĐ iŶteƌests, iŵpƌoǀe eĐoŶoŵiĐ 
efficiency and promote the socialist market economy. This provision, while 
comprehensive, does have weaknesses, one of which is the ambiguity of the term 
public interests (society interests) that could be perceived as describing either a 
consumer interest or a national interest.89 Moreover, the provision does not explicitly 
state the hierarchy of its aims. For instance, what happens when a monopolistic 
ĐoŶduĐt that ƌestƌiĐts ĐoŵpetitioŶ ďeŶefits the puďliĐ iŶteƌests? The diǀeƌsitǇ of AML͛s 
goals could impede the enforcement agencies in the performance of their appointed 
tasks siŶĐe theǇ aƌe ďuƌdeŶed ǁith the dutǇ to ƌeĐoŶĐile the laǁ͛s ;soŵeǁhat) 
conflicting aims.90 
 Under art. 9 of the AML, the State Council establishes an Antimonopoly 
Commission that is tasked with the organization, coordination, and guidance of the 
antimonopoly work. Contrariwise, art. 10 of the AML does not establish a specific 
agency in charge of the antimonopoly enforcement, albeit it stipulates that said 
enforcement should be carried out in accordance with the provision of the law. By 
virtue of art. 10 of the law three enforcement agencies have been established by the 
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State Council:91 the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) that enforces the merger 
control regime, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) that 
enforces the prohibitions of the AML regarding price-related anticompetitive conducts 
and the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) that has authority over 
non-price related matters.92 
 Regarding the competent enforcement agency, under the scope of AML, there 
were different opinions expressed during the drafting process. Some supported the 
idea that MOFCOM should be the designated enforcement authority, others believed 
that SAIC was more suitable as the competent enforcement authority and finally, there 
were those who advocated in favor of the establishment of a brand new independent 
anti-monopoly law enforcement authority.93 The argumentation in favor of a new 
independent enforcement authority was sound and adhered to the common 
international precept: a new independent enforcement agency due to its lack of prior 
connection with any administrative organ could ensure a low probability of influence 
during the exercise of its duties. Furthermore, with an enhanced authority, a new 
enforcement agency would not hesitate to take actions against state-owned 
enterprises as well as other administrative organs, since its autonomy from political 
branches would be ensured by its independence.94 Finally, a new agency could be 
designed with a considerable amount of resources that would enable the exercise of 
its duties.95 
 Despite the different opinions, the State Council enacted to entrust the 
enforcement of AML to three different agencies: MOFCOM, NRDC and SAIC. However, 
a number of problems arise from this decision. The AML units within these agencies 
are relatively small, with a limited amount of resources that could, subsequently, 
restrict the performance of their duties. The basic functions of these agencies as stated 
ďǇ Williaŵ E. KoǀaĐiĐ iŶ the aƌtiĐle ͚CoŵpetitioŶ poliĐǇ aŶd state-owned enterprises in 
ChiŶa͛ aƌe the folloǁiŶg: ͞NRDC has eǆteŶsiǀe iŶdustƌial poliĐǇ functions (including 
price control). MOFCOM oversees domestic and foreign trade and international 
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economic cooperation. SAIC promotes and regulates entrepreneurship through 
ƌegistƌatioŶ aŶd adŵiŶistƌatioŶ of ďusiŶess eŶteƌpƌises͟.96 These agencies enforce the 
AML along with attending to their basic functions. It is a given for those agencies, that 
conflict shall ensue between serving competition law and the basic functions granted 
to them by the state. The AML units of these agencies shall also face pressure from 
other government bodies, even some functioning at a higher level, such as ministries, 
which adopt countervailing policies that promote specific interests, e.g. economic 
interests of a state-owned enterprise.97 
 Another drawback of the three-tiered enforcement system established in 
accordance with the AML, is the fact that, in reality, monopolistic cases may not 
involve only one form of violation, since a combination of price and non-price related 
elements in a single case is not unusual. For those cases, it is not abundantly clear 
which agency shall have jurisdiction. It is more likely, that the cooperation between 
agencies shall be necessary, a fact that could potentially cause conflict and friction 
among them. 
 The last clause of art. 10 of the AML stipulates that the competent 
enforcement authorities could sanction the delegation of enforcement activities to 
provincial agencies. From this clause, it is surmised that local governments are 
ineligible, without the proper authorization, to perform enforcement activities, a task 
conserved for the competent agencies of the central government. 
 The last important point regarding the enforcement regime established under 
the AML is presented in art. 51 of the law where it is stipulated that the authority with 
the power to enforce the AML is not empowered to punish administrative agencies 
that abuse their power. Essentially, in the event of an abuse of administrative power 
by the corresponding agency, the competent -under the AML- enforcement authority 
shall subŵit a pƌoposal to the adŵiŶistƌatiǀe ageŶĐǇ͛s higheƌ-level authority regarding 
the abusive practice. The final clause of this article refers to the supremacy of other 
laws or regulations that regulate the function of administrative agencies and any 
potential abuse of their power, over the provisions of the AML. 
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 This controversial provision presents certain problems. First, it is highly possible 
that a restriction on competition by the abuse of administrative power is performed 
with the intention of gaining economic benefits (favoritism of state-owned 
enterprises). If that be the case, the higher-level authority shall decide upon the 
behavior of its inferior agency and take into account the interests of the competitors. 
This presents a problem without a solution: an administrative agency participates in 
the market as an operator and it is also the regulator of said market, rendering 
impossible a fair and competition-friendly market operation, furthermore its affiliate 
higher-level authority shall decide about a potential abusive practice. Second, the 
designation of the higher-level authority as responsible for the imposition of rectifying 
measures or penalties to an inferior agency that abuses its administrative power does 
not guarantee a proper application of competition law, since it is quite possible the 
higher-level authority to have little or no experience regarding competition law and 
policy.98 Third, there is no assurance that the higher-level authority shall, indeed, take 
under consideration the corrective actions addressed in the proposal of the 
enforcement authority since there is no obligation to publicize its decisions and 
therefore, there is no pressure from the public opinions.99 Fourth, this unspecified 
higher-level authority is certainly not a judicial body100 and what happens when the 
administrative organ that commits the abuse is at the highest level of hierarchy? 
Finally, the designation of supremacy of an unspecified number of laws and regulations 
regarding each administrative agency against the AML does not create certainty 
regarding the protection of competition in a relevant market. 
Investigation of suspected monopolistic conducts 
 Chapter 6 of the AML (articles 38 to 45) addresses the procedures followed 
during the investigation of a suspected monopolistic conduct, the obligations of the 
competent authority, as well as potential allowances for the enterprises investigated. 
 According to art. 38 of the AML the competent enforcement authority has also 
the procedural power of investigating suspected monopolistic practices. Any entity or 
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individual can report a suspected monopolistic practice to the enforcement authority 
and it is upon its discretion to further investigate, if it suspects a violation of the law. 
Articles 39 and 40 set strict requirements regarding the procedures that must be 
followed by the enforcement authority during an investigation and furthermore, 
specify the measures that can be taken for the facilitation of the investigation, such as 
inspections in premises relevant to the enterprise under investigation or interviews 
with interested parties.101 
 Under art. 41 of the AML, the enforcement authority is obliged to keep 
confidential any commercial secrets that are disclosed during the investigation, 
whereas under art. 42 of the law, all relevant (to the investigation) parties are obliged 
to enable and not hinder the task of the enforcement. Art. 43 of the law states that the 
enterprise under investigation as well as any other relevant party have the right to 
express their opinions, in order to defend their legitimate interests. According to art. 
44 of the law, the decision regarding the investigation and the verification of a 
monopolistic practice may be publicized if the enforcement authority decides upon it. 
There is no obligation regaƌdiŶg the puďliĐitǇ of the eŶfoƌĐeŵeŶt authoƌitǇ͛s deĐisioŶs, 
which undermines the transparency of the system. 
 Finally, art. 45 of the AML provides for rectifying measures that an enterprise 
can undertake within a specified time limit in order to eliminate all its practices that 
could potentially restrict or eliminate competition. In that case, the enforcement 
authority has the discretion to decide upon the suspension of the investigation that 
could be reinstated under certain circumstances, exhaustively listed in the last clause 
of the provision. This article borrows from the experiences in Japan102 and confirms 
that the main objective of the AML is the protection of competition and not the 
punishment per se of violations. This is quite logical since a mere punishment of the 
offending enterprise shall not restore the competition in the relevant market. 
Nevertheless, caution must be exercised, since it is improbable that an enterprise 
might undertake certain commitments aiming at the delay of the investigation. It 
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should, also, be stressed that the commitments undertaken by an enterprise should 
not be used as evidence of monopolistic practices.103  
Leniency program-penalties-civil liability-administrative review and litigation 
 Chapter 7 of the AML (articles 46 to 54) addresses the matter of the penalties 
in the event of violation of the provisions, the possibility to reduce said penalties under 
certain circumstances, the civil liability that the market operators bear and defines the 
parameters under which an enterprise could seek administrative review of a decision 
made by the competent enforcement authority or proceed to administrative litigation. 
 Art. 46 of the law stipulates the fines that shall be imposed in the case of 
monopolistic agreements along with the confiscation of illegal gains resulted from the 
implementation of the monopolistic agreements. A fine shall be imposed even in the 
case where the monopolistic agreement has not yet been implemented. Also, a fine 
can be imposed to trade associations violating the provisions regarding the 
monopolistic agreements. Finally, the article includes a clause regarding the voluntary 
disclosure of monopolistic agreements along with the presentation of relevant 
evidence and the possibility of reduced fines or no punishment for the reporting 
enterprises. 
 In jurisdictions such as the United States or the European Union, the 
implementation of leniency provisions has assisted in the disclosure and punishment 
of monopolistic agreements (mainly cartels) that have been carried out to the 
detƌiŵeŶt of ĐoŵpetitioŶ as ǁell as ĐoŶsuŵeƌs͛ ƌights. Likeǁise, iŶ the AML theƌe is a 
provision regarding leniency that includes only two conditions: voluntary report the 
monopolistic agreement and provide material evidence.104 A fact that could present an 
obstacle to the leniency program is that the SAIC and the NRDC, as competent 
enforcement authorities do not adhere to the same conditions regarding the 
qualification of the applicants for immunity or reduction in the fines, as Florin Danciu 
stƌesses iŶ the aƌtiĐle ͚ChiŶese leŶieŶĐǇ pƌogƌaŵ-ƌeĐeŶt deǀelopŵeŶts͛, ͞UŶdeƌ the 
NRDC rules all participants can meet the criteria for exemption from penalty even if 
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they initiated or forced other undertakings to collude, whilst under the SAIC rules they 
caŶŶot.͟105 
 Articles 47 and 48 of the law refer to the fines to be imposed in the event of 
abuse of dominant market position and for implementation of an unauthorized 
concentration of undertakings respectively, while art. 49 points out that in the 
determination of the appropriate fine the enforcement authorities shall take under 
consideration the nature, extent and duration of the violation. 
 Art. 50 of the law introduces a private cause of action that can be exercised by 
parties whose legitimate interests have been harmed against enterprises that bear civil 
liability. The intention of the provision to enable consumers to claim restitution for 
their losses against enterprises meets with certain obstacles, since it is not clear in 
which court those private lawsuits could be filed or what should be the measure of 
damages.106 
 Finally, the AML allows for enterprises to seek redress against a decision made 
by the enforcement authorities which was not based on the facts or there was 
misapplication of the law.107 Art. 53 of the law provides that in cases regarding 
decisions on monopolistic agreements or abuse of dominant market position the 
enterprise should either apply for an administrative review and, if dissatisfied with it, 
then proceed to administrative litigation or, alternatively, proceed from the beginning 
with administrative litigation. This does not apply for concentration of undertakings 
due to their technical nature and therefore, the procedure that must be followed is 
that firstly, the enterprise files for administrative review and afterward, if dissatisfied 
with the results of the administrative review, it may file a suit against the 
administrative agency (administrative litigation).108 This distinction in the AML is 
justified by the fact that Chinese judges lack experience in dealing with complex cases, 
since a large portion of them (until recently) had not received formal legal training or 
training in economics and business109 and concentrations constitute, undeniably, a 
specialized and complicated area. An interesting point of the article that could prove to 
                                                 
105See id 
106Supra note 3, p. 272 
107Supra note 1, p. 112 
108Supra note 1, p 113 
109Supra note 4, p. 242 
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be problematic in practice is that the same enforcement authority that has issued a 
decision shall review it, e.g. MOFCOM will be reviewing its own decisions110 and as 
Angela Huyue Zhang points out in her papeƌ ͚The eŶfoƌĐeŵeŶt of the AŶti-Monopoly 
Laǁ iŶ ChiŶa: AŶ iŶstitutioŶal desigŶ peƌspeĐtiǀe͛, ͞…iŶ the ŵeƌgeƌ ƌeǀieǁ pƌoĐess, 
MOFCOM plays the role of investigator, prosecutor and adjudiĐatoƌ.͟111 
 A final provision referring to administrative sanctions for members of the 
enforcement authorities that abuse their position, engage in malpractices or even 
disclose commercial secrets concludes chapter 7 of the AML.112 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
110Angela Huyue Zhang, ͚The eŶfoƌĐeŵeŶt of the AŶti-Monopoly Law in China: An institutional design 
perspective (2011) The Antitrust Bulletin Vol. 56 No. 3, pp. 630-663, Fall 2011 available at < 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1783037##> [accessed February 13, 2018] 
111See id 
112See Anti-Monopoly Law, supra note 2, art. 54 
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Conclusions 
 While perusing the provisions of the AML, one could easily detect the laǁ͛s 
influences from international practices and legislation (determination of relevant 
market, state aid, leniency program etc.), but also its uniqueness. This law, with its 
long and tortuous history, with the many drafts and the many reviews, with 
controversies and dissenting opinions characterizing a number of its provisions, has 
managed nonetheless to unify competition law that for decades was fragmented over 
various laws and regulations and in that spirit, it is indeed a most competent 
competition law. 
 As a rule, no legislation is perfect. There are always vague or inadequately 
drafted provisions, indications of favoritism or legal vacuums. In the AML there are 
undefined terms, such as public interests or national security, there are catch-all 
provisions that grant the competent authority a broad discretion to decide upon 
specific matters, there are indications -despite the laǁ͛s ďest iŶteŶtioŶs- of favoritism 
towards domestic enterprises,113 and also there are provisions that betray the 
indecision of the drafters, e.g. art. 7. To balance those elements, there are provisions 
addressing important issues, such as the abuse of administrative power, there are 
provisions crafting a sturdy concentration regime and also there are provisions 
stipulating strict terms for the inspection of suspected monopolistic conducts. 
 And then there is the matter of the enforcement. In a nutshell, there are three 
main reasons for ineffective regulation of monopolies and competition in China: first, 
the lack of uniformity, caused by the fragmented provisions on monopolies over 
various laws and regulations resulting in undermining the authority of said provisions, 
second, the lack of decisive enforcement measures against monopolistic practices, that 
were also scattered over various provisions, and finally, a weak enforcement 
authority.114 The AML provides an impressive competition framework, but its 
enforcement provisions, institute exemptions115 that could undermine the uniform 
implementation of enforcement. Finally, the three enforcement agencies-system could 
                                                 
113See Anti-Monopoly Law, supra note 2, art. 31 that stipulates the national security review 
114Supra note 67, p. 875 see n44 
115See Anti-Monopoly Law, supra note 2, art. 51 that essentially stipulates a different enforcement 
regime for administrative agencies 
  -39- 
prove problematic, since competition cases can involve a wide range of violations. At 
the end of the day, even an exceptional law if combined with ineffective enforcement, 
simply cannot achieve its potential. 
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Appendix 
Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s RepuďliĐ of China 
㸦Adopted at the 29th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Tenth National 
People's Congress on August 30, 2007㸧 
 
Chapter I General Provisions 
 
Article 1 This Law is enacted for the purpose of preventing and restraining monopolistic 
conducts, protecting fair market competition, enhancing economic efficiency, 
safeguarding the interests of consumers and the interests of the society as a whole, and 
promoting the healthy development of socialist market economy. 
 
Article 2 This Law is applicable to monopolistic conducts in economic activities within 
the territory of the People's Republic of China㸹 and it is applicable to monopolistic 
conducts outside the territory of the People's Republic of China, which serve to 
eliminate or restrict competition on the domestic market of China. 
 
Article 3 For the purposes of this Law, monopolistic conducts include㸸 
 
㸦1㸧 monopoly agreements reached between undertakings 㸹 
 
㸦2㸧 abuse of dominant market position by undertakings㸹 and 
 
㸦3㸧 concentration of undertakings that lead, or may lead to elimination or restriction 
of competition. 
 
Article 4 The State shall formulate and implement competition rules which are 
compatible with the socialist market economy, in order to improve macro-economic 
regulation and build up a sound market network which operates in an integrated, open, 
competitive and orderly manner. 
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Article 5 Undertakings may, through fair competition and voluntary association, get 
themselves concentrated according to law, to expand the scale of their business 
operations and enhance their competitiveness on the market. 
 
Article 6 Undertakings holding a dominant position on the market may not abuse such 
position to eliminate or restrict competition. 
 
Article 7 With respect to the industries which are under the control of by the State-
owned economic sector and have a bearing on the lifeline of the national economy or 
national security and the industries which exercise monopoly over the production and 
sale of certain commodities according to law, the State shall protect the lawful business 
operations of undertakings in these industries, and shall, in accordance with law, 
supervise and regulate their business operations and the prices of the commodities and 
services provided by them, in order to protect the consumers' interests and facilitate 
technological advance. 
 
The undertakings mentioned in the preceding paragraph shall do business according to 
law, be honest, faithful and strictly self-disciplined, and subject themselves to public 
supervision, and they shall not harm the consumers' interests by taking advantage of 
their position of control or their monopolistic production and sale of certain 
commodities. 
 
Article 8 Administrative departments or organizations authorized by laws or regulations 
to perform the function of administering public affairs may not abuse their 
administrative power to eliminate or restrict competition. 
 
Article 9 The State Council shall establish an anti-monopoly commission to be in charge 
of organizing, coordinating and guiding anti-monopoly work and to perform the 
following duties㸸 
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㸦1㸧 studying and drafting policies on competition㸹 
 
㸦2㸧organizing investigation and assessment of competition on the market as a whole 
and publishing assessment reports㸹 
 
㸦3㸧 formulating and releasing anti-monopoly guidelines㸹 
 
㸦4㸧 coordinating administrative enforcement of the Anti-Monopoly Law㸹 and 
 
㸦5㸧 other duties as prescribed by the State Council. 
 
The composition of and procedural rules for the anti-monopoly commission shall be 
specified by the State Council. 
 
Article 10 The authorities responsible for enforcement of the Anti-monopoly Law 
specified by the State Council 㸦hereinafter referred to, in general, as the authority for 
enforcement of the Anti-monopoly Law under the State Council㸧 shall be in charge of 
such enforcement in accordance with the provisions of this Law. 
 
The authority for enforcement of the Anti-monopoly Law under the State Council may, 
in light of the need of work, empower the appropriate departments of the people's 
governments of provinces, autonomous regions or municipalities directly under the 
Central Government to take charge of relevant enforcement of the Anti-monopoly Law 
in accordance with the provisions of this Law. 
 
Article 11 Trade associations shall tighten their self-discipline, give guidance to the 
undertakings in their respective trades in lawful competition, and maintain the market 
order in competition. 
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Article 12 For the purposes of this Law, undertakings include natural persons, legal 
persons, and other organizations that engage in manufacturing, or selling commodities 
or providing services. 
 
For the purposes of this Law, a relevant market consists of the range of the commodities 
for which, and the regions where, undertakings compete each other during a given 
period of time for specific commodities or services 㸦hereinafter referred to, in general, 
as ͞Đoŵŵodities͟㸧。 
 
Chapter II Monopoly Agreements 
 
Article 13 Competing undertakings are prohibited from concluding the following 
monopoly agreements㸸 
 
㸦1㸧 on fixing or changing commodity prices㸹 
 
㸦2㸧on restricting the amount of commodities manufactured or marketed㸹 
 
㸦3㸧on splitting the sales market or the purchasing market for raw and semi-finished 
materials㸹 
 
㸦4㸧on restricting the purchase of new technologies or equipment, or the 
development of new technologies or products㸹 
 
㸦5㸧 on joint boycotting of transactions㸹 and 
 
㸦6㸧other monopoly agreements confirmed as such by the authority for enforcement 
of the Anti-monopoly Law under the State Council. 
 
For the purposes of this Law, monopoly agreements include agreements, decisions and 
other concerted conducts designed to eliminate or restrict competition. 
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Article 14 Undertakings are prohibited from concluding the following monopoly 
agreements with their trading counterparts㸸 
 
㸦1㸧 on fixing the prices of commodities resold to a third party㸹 
 
㸦2㸧 on restricting the lowest prices for commodities resold to a third party㸹 and 
 
㸦3㸧other monopoly agreements confirmed as such by the authority for enforcement 
of the Anti-monopoly Law under the State Council. 
 
Article 15 The provisions of Article 13 and 14 of this Law shall not be applicable to the 
agreements between undertakings which they can prove to be concluded for one of the 
following purposes㸸 
 
㸦1㸧 improving technologies, or engaging in research and development of new 
products㸹 or 
 
㸦2㸧 improving product quality, reducing cost, and enhancing efficiency, unifying 
specifications and standards of products, or implementing specialized division of 
production㸹 
 
㸦3㸧 increasing the efficiency and competitiveness of small and medium-sized 
undertakings㸹 
 
㸦4㸧 serving public interests in energy conservation, environmental protection and 
disaster relief㸹 
 
㸦5㸧 mitigating sharp decrease in sales volumes or obvious overproduction caused by 
economic depression㸹 
   
  -6- 
 
㸦6㸧 safeguarding legitimate interests in foreign trade and in economic cooperation 
with foreign counterparts㸹 or 
 
㸦7㸧 other purposes as prescribed by law or the State Council. 
 
In the cases as specified in Subparagraphs 㸦1㸧 through 㸦5㸧 of the preceding 
paragraph, where the provisions of Articles 13 and 14 of this Law are not applicable, the 
undertakings shall, in addition, prove that the agreements reached will not substantially 
restrict competition in the relevant market and that they can enable the consumers to 
share the benefits derived therefrom. 
 
Article 16 Trade associations may not make arrangements for undertakings within their 
respective trades to engage in the monopolistic practices prohibited by the provisions of 
this Chapter. 
 
Chapter III Abuse of Dominant Market Position 
 
Article 17 Undertakings holding dominant market positions are prohibited from doing 
the following by abusing their dominant market positions㸸 
 
㸦1㸧 selling commodities at unfairly high prices or buying commodities at unfairly low 
prices㸹 
 
㸦2㸧 without justifiable reasons, selling commodities at prices below cost㸹 
 
㸦3㸧 without justifiable reasons, refusing to enter into transactions with their trading 
counterparts㸹 
 
㸦4㸧 without justifiable reasons, allowing their trading counterparts to make 
transactions exclusively with themselves or with the undertakings designated by them㸹 
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㸦5㸧 without justifiable reasons, conducting tie-in sale of commodities or adding other 
unreasonable trading conditions to transactions㸹 
 
㸦6㸧 without justifiable reasons, applying differential prices and other transaction 
terms among their trading counterparts who are on an equal footing㸹 or 
 
㸦7㸧 other acts of abuse of dominant market positions confirmed as such by the 
authority for enforcement of the Anti-monopoly Law under the State Council. 
 
For the purposes of this Law, dominant market position means a market position held 
by undertakings that are capable of controlling the prices or quantities of commodities 
or other transaction terms in a relevant market, or preventing or exerting an influence 
on the access of other undertakings to the market. 
 
Article 18 The dominant market position of an undertaking shall be determined on the 
basis of the following factors㸸 
 
㸦1㸧 its share on a relevant market and the competitiveness on the market㸹 
 
㸦2㸧 its ability to control the sales market or the purchasing marker for raw and semi-
finished materials㸹 
 
㸦3㸧 its financial strength and technical conditions㸹 
 
㸦4㸧 the extent to which other business mangers depend on it in transactions 㸹 
 
㸦5㸧 the difficulty that other undertakings find in entering a relevant market㸹 and 
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㸦6㸧 other factors related to the determination of the dominant market position held 
by an undertaking. 
 
Article 19 The conclusion that an undertaking holds a dominant market position may be 
deduced from any one of the following circumstances㸸 
 
㸦1㸧 the market share of one undertaking accounts for half of the total in a relevant 
market㸹 
 
㸦2㸧 the joint market share of two undertakings accounts for two-thirds of the total, in 
a relevant market㸹 or 
 
㸦3㸧 the joint market share of three undertakings accounts for three-fourths of the 
total in a relevant market. 
 
Under the circumstance specified in Subparagraph 㸦2㸧 or 㸦3㸧 of the preceding 
paragraph, if the market share of one of the undertakings is less than one-tenths of the 
total, the undertakings shall not be considered to have a dominant market position. 
 
Where an undertaking that is considered to hold a dominant market position has 
evidence to the contrary, he shall not be considered to hold a dominant market 
position. 
 
Chapter IV Concentration of Undertakings 
 
Article 20 Concentration of undertakings means the following㸸 
 
㸦1㸧 merger of undertakings㸹 
 
㸦2㸧 control over other undertakings gained by an undertaking through acquiring their 
shares or assets㸹 and 
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㸦3㸧 control over other undertakings or the ability capable of exerting a decisive 
influence on the same gained by an undertaking through signing contracts or other 
means. 
 
Article 21 When their intended concentration reaches the threshold level as set by the 
State Council, undertakings shall declare in advance to the authority for enforcement of 
the Anti-monopoly Law under the State Council㸹 they shall not implement the 
concentration in the absence of such declaration. 
 
Article 22 In any of the following circumstances, undertakings may dispense with 
declaration to the authority for enforcement of the Anti-monopoly Law under the State 
Council㸸 
 
㸦1㸧 one of the undertakings involved in the concentration owns 50 percent or more 
of the voting shares or assets of each of the other undertakings㸹 or 
 
㸦2㸧 one and the same undertaking not involved in the concentration owns 50 percent 
or more of the voting shares or assets of each of the undertakings involved in the 
concentration. 
 
Article 23 To declare concentration to the authority for enforcement of the Anti-
monopoly Law under the State Council, the undertakings shall submit the following 
documents and materials㸸 
 
㸦1㸧 declaration in writing㸹 
 
㸦2㸧 explanation of the impact to be exerted by the concentration on competition in a 
relevant market㸹 
 
㸦3㸧 concentration agreement㸹 
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㸦4㸧the financial report of each of the undertakings in the previous fiscal year, which 
is audited by a certified public accountant firm㸹 and 
 
㸦5㸧 other documents and materials as specified by the authority for enforcement of 
the Anti-monopoly Law under the State Council. 
 
In the written declaration shall clearly be stated the titles of the undertakings involved 
in the concentration, their domiciles, business scopes, the anticipated date for 
concentration and other matters specified by the authority for enforcement of the Anti-
monopoly Law under the State Council. 
 
Article 24 In case documents or materials submitted by the undertakings are 
incomplete, the undertakings concerned shall supplement the relevant documents or 
materials within the time limit prescribed by the authority for enforcement of the Anti-
monopoly Law under the State Council. If they fail to do so at the expiration of the time 
limit, they shall be deemed to have made no declaration. 
 
Article 25 The authority for enforcement of the Anti-monopoly Law under the State 
Council shall, within 30 days from the date it receives the documents or materials 
submitted by the undertakings which conform to the provisions of Article 23 of this Law, 
make a preliminary review of the concentration declared by the businesses and make a 
decision whether to conduct a further review, and notify the undertakings of its decision 
in writing. Before the authority for enforcement of the Anti-monopoly Law under the 
State Council makes such decision, the undertakings shall not implement concentration. 
 
Where the authority for enforcement of the Anti-monopoly Law under the State Council 
decides not to conduct further review or fails to make such a decision at the expiration 
of the specified time limit, the undertakings may implement concentration. 
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Article 26 Where the authority for enforcement of the Anti-monopoly Law under the 
State Council decides to conduct further review, it shall, within 90 days from the date of 
decision, complete such review, decide whether to prohibit the undertakings from 
concentrating, and notify them of such decision in writing. Where a decision on 
prohibiting the undertakings from concentrating is made, the reasons for such decision 
shall be given. The undertakings shall not implement concentration during the period of 
review. 
 
Under any of the following circumstances, the authority for enforcement of the Anti-
monopoly Law under the State Council may extend the period for review as specified in 
the preceding paragraph on condition that it notifies the undertakings of the extension 
in writing, however, the extension shall not exceed the maximum of 60 days㸸 
 
㸦1㸧 The undertakings agree to the extension㸹 
 
㸦2㸧The documents or materials submitted by undertakings are inaccurate and 
therefore need further verification㸹 or 
 
㸦3㸧 major changes have take place after the undertakings made the declaration. 
 
Where the authority for enforcement of the Anti-monopoly Law under the State Council 
fails to make a decision at the expiration of the time limit, the undertakings may 
implement concentration. 
 
Article 27 The following factors shall be taken into consideration in the review of 
concentration of undertakings㸸 
 
㸦1㸧 the market shares of the undertakings involved in concentration in a relevant 
market and their power of control over the market㸹 
 
㸦2㸧 the degree of concentration in relevant market㸹 
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㸦3㸧 the impact of their concentration on assess to the market and technological 
advance㸹 
 
㸦4㸧 the impact of their concentration on consumers and the other relevant 
undertakings concerned㸹 
 
㸦5㸧 the impact of their concentration on the development of the national economy㸹 
and 
 
㸦6㸧 other factors which the authority for enforcement of the Anti-monopoly Law 
under the State Council deems to need consideration in terms of its impact on market 
competition. 
 
Article 28 If the concentration of undertakings leads, or may lead, to elimination or 
restriction of competition, the authority for enforcement of the Anti-monopoly Law 
under the State Council shall make a decision to prohibit their concentration. However, 
if the undertakings concerned can prove that the advantages of such concentration to 
competition obviously outweigh the disadvantages, or that the concentration is in the 
public interest, the authority for enforcement of the Anti-monopoly Law under the State 
Council may decide not to prohibit their concentration. 
 
Article 29 Where the authority for enforcement of the Anti-monopoly Law under the 
State Council does not prohibit the concentration of undertakings, it may decide to 
impose additional, restrictive conditions for lessening the negative impact exerted by 
such concentration on competition. 
 
Article 30 The authority for enforcement of the Anti-monopoly Law under the State 
Council shall, in a timely manner, publish its decisions on prohibition against the 
concentration of undertakings or its decisions on imposing additional restrictive 
conditions on the implementation of such concentration. 
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Article 31 Where a foreign investor participates in the concentration of undertakings by 
merging and acquiring a domestic enterprise or by any other means, which involves 
national security, the matter shall be subject to review on national security as is 
required by the relevant State regulations, in addition to the review on the 
concentration of undertakings in accordance with the provisions of this Law. 
 
Chapter V Abuse of Administrative Power to Eliminate or Restrict Competition 
 
Article 32 Administrative departments and other organizations authorized by laws or 
regulations to perform the function of administering public affairs may not abuse their 
administrative power to require, or require in disguised form, units or individuals to deal 
in, purchase or use only the commodities supplied by the undertakings designated by 
them. 
 
Article 33 Administrative departments and other organizations authorized by laws or 
regulations to perform the function of administering public affairs may not abuse their 
administrative power to impede the free flow of commodities between different regions 
by any of the following means㸸 
 
㸦1㸧 setting discriminatory charging items, implementing discriminatory charge rates, 
or fixing discriminatory prices for non-local commodities㸹 
 
㸦2㸧 imposing technical specifications or test standards on non-local commodities, 
which are different from those on local commodities of similar types, or taking 
discriminatory technical measures, such as repeated test and repeated certification, 
against non-local commodities, for the purpose of restricting the access of non-local 
commodities to the local market㸹 
 
㸦3㸧 adopting a special practice of administrative licensing for non-local commodities, 
for the purpose of restricting the access of non-local commodities to the local market㸹 
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㸦4㸧 erecting barriers or adopting other means to prevent non-local commodities from 
coming in or local commodities from going out㸹 or 
 
㸦5㸧 other means designed to impede the free flow of commodities between regions. 
 
Article 34 Administrative departments and other organizations authorized by laws or 
regulations to perform the function of administering public affairs may not abuse their 
administrative power to exclude non-local undertakings from participating, or restrict 
their participation, in local invitation and tendering by imposing discriminatory 
qualification requirements or assessment standards, or by refusing to publish 
information according to law. 
 
Article 35 Administrative departments and other organizations authorized by laws or 
regulations to perform the function of administering public affairs may not abuse their 
administrative power to exclude non-local undertakings from making investment or 
restrict their investment locally or exclude them from establishing branch offices locally 
or restrict their establishment of such offices, by treating them unequally as compared 
with the local undertakings, or by other means. 
 
Article 36 Administrative departments and other organizations authorized by laws or 
regulations to perform the function of administering public affairs may not abuse their 
administrative power to compel undertakings to engage in monopolistic conducts that 
are prohibited by this Law. 
 
Article 37 Administrative organs may not abuse their administrative power to formulate 
regulations with the contents of eliminating or restricting competition. 
 
Chapter VI Investigation into Suspected Monopolistic Conducts 
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Article 38 The authority for enforcement of the Anti-monopoly Law shall investigate any 
suspected monopolistic conduct according to law. 
 
All units and individuals shall have the right to report to the authority for enforcement 
of the Anti-monopoly Law against suspected monopolistic conducts. The latter shall 
keep the informations confidential. 
 
If the report is made in writing and relevant facts and evidence are provided, the 
authority for enforcement of the Anti-monopoly Law shall conduct necessary 
investigation. 
 
Article 39 When conducting investigations into a suspected monopolistic conduct, the 
authority for enforcement of the Anti-monopoly Law may take the following 
measures㸸 
 
㸦1㸧 conducting inspection of the business places or the relevant premises of the 
undertakings under investigation㸹 
 
㸦2㸧 making inquiries of the undertakings under investigation, the interested parties, 
or other units or individuals involved, and requesting them to provide relevant 
explanations㸹 
 
㸦3㸧 consulting and duplicating the relevant documents and materials of the 
undertakings under investigation, the interested parties and other relevant units and 
individuals, such as bills, certificates, agreements, account books, business 
correspondence and electronic data㸹 
 
㸦4㸧 sealing up or seizing relevant evidence㸹 and 
 
㸦5㸧 inquiring about the bank accounts of the undertakings under investigation. 
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For taking the measures specified in the preceding paragraph, a written report shall be 
submitted for approval to the principal leading person of the authority for enforcement 
of the Anti-monopoly Law. 
 
Article 40 For the authority for enforcement of the Anti-monopoly Law to conduct 
investigation into suspected monopolistic conducts, there shall be at least two law-
enforcement officers, who shall produce their law enforcement papers. 
 
The law-enforcement officers shall make written records when conducting inquiry and 
investigation, which shall be signed by the persons after being inquired or investigated. 
 
Article 41 The authority for enforcement of the Anti-monopoly Law and its staff 
members are obligated to keep confidential the commercial secrets they come to have 
access to in the course of law enforcement. 
 
Article 42 The undertakings under investigation, the interested parties or other relevant 
units or individuals shall cooperate with the authority for enforcement of the Anti-
monopoly Law in performing their duties in accordance with law, and they shall not 
refuse to submit to or hinder the investigation conducted by the authority for 
enforcement of the Anti-monopoly Law. 
 
Article 43 The undertakings under investigation and the interested parties shall have the 
right to make statements. The authority for enforcement of the Anti-monopoly Law 
shall verify the facts, justifications and evidence presented by the said undertakings or 
interested parties. 
 
Article 44 Where after investigation into and verification of the suspected monopolistic 
conduct, the authority for enforcement of the Anti-monopoly Law concludes that it 
constitutes a monopolistic conduct, the said authority shall make a decision on how to 
deal with it in accordance with law and may make the matter known to the public. 
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Article 45 With respect to the suspected monopolistic conduct which is under 
investigation by the authority for enforcement of the Anti-monopoly Law, if the 
undertakings under investigation commits themselves to adopt specific measures to 
eliminate the consequences of its conduct within a certain period of time which is 
accepted by the said authority, the authority for enforcement of the Anti-monopoly Law 
may decide to suspend the investigation. In the decision shall clearly be stated the 
details of the undertakings' commitments. 
 
Where the authority for enforcement of the Anti-monopoly Law decides to suspend 
investigation, it shall oversee the fulfillment of the commitments made by the 
undertaking. Where the undertaking fulfills its commitments, the authority for 
enforcement of the Anti-monopoly Law may decide to terminate the investigation. 
 
In any of the following circumstances, the authority for enforcement of the Anti-
monopoly Law shall resume investigation㸸 
 
㸦1㸧 The undertakings concerned fail to fulfill its commitments㸹 
 
㸦2㸧 Material changes have taken place in respect of the facts on which the decision to 
suspend investigation was based㸹 or 
 
㸦3㸧 The decision to suspend investigation was based on incomplete or untrue 
information provided by the undertaking concerned. 
 
Chapter VII Legal Liabilities 
 
Article 46 Where an undertaking, in violation of the provisions of this Law, concludes 
and implements a monopoly agreement, the authority for enforcement of the Anti-
monopoly Law shall instruct it to discontinue the violation, confiscate its unlawful gains, 
and, in addition, impose on it a fine of not less than one percent but not more than 10 
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percent of its sales achieved in the previous year. If such monopoly agreement has not 
been implemented, it may be fined not more than RMB 500,000 yuan. 
 
If the business manage, on its own initiative, reports to the authority for enforcement of 
the Anti-monopoly Law about the monopoly agreement reached, and provides material 
evidence, the said authority may, at its discretion, mitigate, or exempt the undertaking 
from, punishment. 
 
Where a trade association, in violation of the provisions of this Law, has arranged the 
undertaking in the trade to reach a monopoly agreement, the authority for enforcement 
of the Anti-monopoly Law may impose on it a fine of not more than 500,000 yuan. If the 
circumstances are serious, the administrative department for the registration of public 
organizations may cancel the registration of the trade association in accordance with 
law. 
 
Article 47 Where an undertaking, in violation of the provisions of this Law, abuses its 
dominant market position, the authority for enforcement of the Anti-monopoly Law 
shall instruct it to discontinue such violation, confiscate its unlawful gains and, in 
addition, impose on it a fine of not less than one percent but not more than 10 percent 
of its sales achieved in the previous year. 
 
Article 48 Where the undertakings, in violation of the provisions of this Law, implement 
concentration, the authority for enforcement of the Anti-monopoly Law under the State 
Council shall instruct them to discontinue such concentration, and within a specified 
time limit to dispose of their shares or assets, transfer the business and adopt other 
necessary measures to return to the state prior to the concentration, and it may impose 
on them a fine of not more than 500,000 yuan. 
 
Article 49 To determine the specific amount of fines prescribed in Articles 46, 47 and 48, 
the authority for enforcement of the Anti-monopoly Law shall consider such factors as 
the nature, extent and duration of the violations. 
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Article 50 Where the monopolistic conduct of an undertaking has caused losses to 
another person, it shall bear civil liabilities according to law. 
 
Article 51 Where an administrative development or an organization authorized by laws 
or regulations to perform the function of administering public affairs abuses its 
administrative power to eliminate or restrict competition, the department at a higher 
level shall instruct it to rectify㸹 the leading person directly in charge and the other 
persons directly responsible shall be given administrative sanctions in accordance with 
law. The authority for enforcement of the Anti-monopoly Law may submit a proposal to 
the relevant department at a higher level for handling the matter according to law. 
 
Where otherwise provided for by laws or administrative regulations in respect of 
administrative departments or organizations authorized by laws or regulations to 
perform the function of administering public affairs that abuse their administrative 
power to eliminate or restrict competition, such provisions shall prevail. 
 
Article 52 Where, during the review and investigation conducted by the authority for 
enforcement of the Anti-monopoly Law, a unit or individual refuses to provide relevant 
materials or information, or provides false materials or information, or conceals, or 
destroys, or transfers evidence, or refuses to submit to or obstructs investigation in any 
other manner, the authority for enforcement of the Anti-monopoly Law shall instruct 
it/him to rectify, and a fine of not more than 20,000 yuan shall be imposed on the 
individual and not more than 200,000 yuan on the unit㸹 if the circumstances are 
serious, a fine of not less than 20,000 yuan but not more than 100,000 yuan shall be 
imposed on the individual and not less than 200,000 yuan but not more than one million 
yuan on the unit㸹 and if a crime is constituted, criminal liability shall be investigated for 
in accordance with law. 
 
Article 53 Where an undertaking is dissatisfied with the decision made by the authority 
for enforcement of the Anti-monopoly Law in accordance with the provisions of Article 
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28 or 29 of this Law, it may first apply for administrative reconsideration according to 
law㸹 and if it is dissatisfied with the decision made after administrative 
reconsideration, it may bring an administrative action before the court according to law. 
 
Where an undertaking is dissatisfied with any decision made by the authority for 
enforcement of the Anti-monopoly Law other than the decisions specified in the 
preceding paragraph, it may apply for administrative reconsideration or bring an 
administrative action before the court according to law. 
 
Article 54 Where a staff member of the authority for enforcement of the Anti-monopoly 
Law abuses his power, neglects his duty, engages in malpractices for personal gain, or 
divulges commercial secrets he comes to have access to in the course of law 
enforcement, which constitutes a crime, he shall be investigated for criminal liability 
according to law㸹 and if his case is not serious enough to constitute a crime, he shall be 
given an administrative sanction according to law. 
 
Chapter VIII Supplementary Provisions 
 
Article 55 This law is not applicable to undertakings who exercise their intellectual 
property rights in accordance with the laws and administrative regulations on 
intellectual property rights㸹 however, this Law shall be applicable to the undertakings 
who eliminate or restrict market competition by abusing their intellectual property 
rights. 
 
Article 56 This Law is not applicable to the association or cooperation by agricultural 
producers or rural economic organizations in their business activities of production, 
processing, sale, transportation, storage of farm products, etc. 
 
Article 57 This Law shall go into effect as of August 1, 2008. 
 
